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Performance funding is a method of funding public institutions based not on 
inputs, such as enrollments, but on outcomes, such as retention, degree completion, and 
job placement (Burke, 2002a; Dougherty & Hong, 2006; Layzell, 1999; Ruppert, 1995). 
The principal rationale for performance funding has been that performance funding will 
prod institutions to be more effective and efficient, particularly in a time of increasing 
demands on higher education and increasingly straitened state finances. 
This report examines the origins of state performance funding in six states: 
Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. These six states 
were chosen with an eye to enabling us to explore the establishment of state performance 
funding systems from a wide variety of angles. The states differ in the histories and 
structures of their state performance funding systems, higher education governance 
arrangements, political systems, political cultures, and social characteristics. We analyze 
each of our six cases in turn, beginning with the earliest case, Tennessee. We examine the 
supporters and opponents of performance funding, their beliefs and interests, how 
performance funding came to be identified as a policy option, and the political openings 
that allowed advocates of performance funding to place it on the government decision 
agenda. At the end of the report, we summarize these findings—looking across all six 
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Performance funding is a method of funding public institutions based not on 
inputs such as enrollments but on outcomes such as retention, degree completion, and job 
placement (Burke, 2002a; Dougherty & Hong, 2006; Layzell, 1999; Ruppert, 1995). The 
principal rationale for performance funding has been that performance funding will prod 
institutions to be more effective and efficient, particularly in a time of increasing 
demands on higher education and increasingly straitened state finances. 
 Higher education institutions receive performance accountability demands from 
state and federal governments. But in light of state governments’ dominant role in 
funding and governing public colleges and universities,1 this report focuses on the origins 
of a particular type of state accountability system: performance funding program.  
 One of the mysteries of state performance funding systems is that they are not 
more widespread. While there has been great interest in performance funding for over 30 
years, only half of all states have ever created a performance funding system for higher 
education (Dougherty & Reid, 2007). This poses the question: What forces have driven 
the development of performance funding and how do those forces differ across states?  
 This report will examine the origins of state performance funding in six states: 
Florida, Illinois, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. We chose these 
states because they have considerably different state performance funding systems and 
histories as well as higher education governance arrangements, political systems, political 
cultures, and social characteristics, all of which will enable us to look at the formation of 
state performance funding systems from a wide variety of angles.  
 In analyzing the political origins of state performance funding systems, we will 
draw on two powerful theories of policy origins: the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and the Policy Entrepreneurship perspective (Mintrom & 
Norman, 2009). We will be using these theories heuristically, as sensitizing constructs 
that point us toward examining different features of the policy process in our six states. 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework focuses our attention on how policy evolves over 
                                                 
1 As of fiscal year 2006–2007, appropriations and grants from state governments comprised about 27% of 
all revenues for public degree-granting institutions (not including state capital appropriations and grants) 







long periods of time, driven by the efforts of different “advocacy coalitions” that have 
distinctive sets of beliefs about how society is and should be organized and what form 
higher education policy should take. The Policy Entrepreneurship perspective highlights 
the role of policy entrepreneurs who identify public issues, develop policy solutions, 
bring together political coalitions, and take advantage of timing and political 
opportunities to promote their policy issues and solutions.  
 In this report, we analyze each of our six cases in turn, examining the supporters 
and opponents of performance funding, their beliefs and interests, how performance 
funding was introduced into state policy debates, and the political openings that allowed 
advocates of performance funding to place it on the government decision agenda. At the 
end of the report, we summarize these findings—looking across all six cases—and draw 
lessons for policymakers.  
1.1 Research Methods 
Choosing the states. We chose six states with an eye to allowing for considerable 
variation across cases in terms of the timing of performance funding, the higher education 
sectors it covered, the amount of funding involved, the governance structure for higher 
education, a state’s political culture, a state’s government structure, and a state’s social 
characteristics. Because this was an exploratory study, the aim was to maximize the range 
of state differences in order to capture a wide range of possible forces at work in the 
origins of performance funding. Hence, the states chosen vary along several different 
dimensions (see Table 1).  
 One dimension was when performance funding was established. Tennessee 
established its system in 1979, Missouri and Florida in the early 1990s (1993 and 1994), 
and the other states in the late 1990s (South Carolina in 1996, Washington in 1997, and 
Illinois in 1998).  
 Secondly, the states retained performance funding for varying lengths of time. 
Tennessee and Florida have retained performance funding to this day.2 However, Illinois, 
Missouri, and South Carolina relinquished their systems more or less rapidly (four years 
in Illinois, seven years in South Carolina, and nine years in Missouri). Washington 
                                                 
2 Florida established two performance funding systems: Performance-Based Budgeting, which survives to 







relinquished performance funding in 1999 after two years but then reestablished it eight 
years later.  
 The states also differ in terms of which sectors of public higher education were 
subject to performance funding. The systems in Florida, Illinois, and Washington (post-
2007) applied only to community colleges. However, those in Missouri, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Washington (1997–1999) applied to all of public higher education.   
 In addition, the states vary considerably in the proportion of state higher 
education funding taken up by performance funding. It accounted for a much larger share 
of the state appropriation for higher education in South Carolina, Florida, and Tennessee 
than in Illinois, Missouri, and Washington.  
 Fifth, higher education governance structures vary considerably across the states 
(McGuinness, 2003). As of 2003, Tennessee’s system was quite centralized, with a strong 
statewide coordinating board, a governing board for the University of Tennessee’s five 
campuses, and a governing board for all the other public universities and the public two-
year colleges. Missouri’s system was at the other pole in degree of centralization; it did 
not have any governing boards or coordinating boards covering all public universities or 
public community colleges and only a weak coordinating board for all public higher 
education. Meanwhile, the other four states fell somewhere in between in their degree of 
centralization (McGuinness, 2003).    
 Sixth, the six states differ considerably in state political culture. Following Daniel 
Elazar’s influential typology of state political cultures, South Carolina and Tennessee are 
“traditionalist,” Florida is a mixture of traditional and “individualistic,” Illinois and 
Missouri are individualistic, and Washington State is “moralistic.” Moralistic political 
cultures are issues-oriented and emphasize the role of government as being for the 
advancement of the common good. Individualistic political cultures are partisan and 
patronage-oriented rather than issues-oriented and emphasize the role of government in 
advancing the interests of one or another contending social group. Traditionalist political 
cultures (concentrated in the Southern states) envision the role of government as limited 









  Tennessee  Missouri  Florida  South Carolina  Washington  Illinois 
             
1. Year PF established  1979  1993  1994  1996  1997  1998 
2. If PF terminated, year of 
termination  
  2002    2003  1999  2002 
3. Duration of PF system if 
given up 
  9 years    7 years  2 years  4 years 
4. If PF system was re‐
established, year done 
        2007   
5. Higher education sectors 
covered  

































































9. Gubernatorial powers (2002)  Above average  Below average  Average  Below average  Below average  Above average 
10. Legislative professionalism 
(2000) 
Below average  Above average  Above average  Below average  Above average  Above average 
11. Party competition index 
(1999‐2003) 
Above average  Above average  Below average  Above average  Above average  Above average 
12. Population (2000)  5,689,000  5,597,000  15,983,000  4,012,000  5,894,000  12,420,000 
13. Personal income per capita 
(2000) 
























 The differences in political culture are accompanied by differences in political 
structure and functioning. Illinois and Tennessee are above average in the institutional 
powers of the governor, whereas the other four states are a little below average (Beyle, 
2004, p. 212). On legislative professionalism, Illinois, Florida, Washington, and Missouri 
are above average, while South Carolina and Tennessee are below average (Hamm & 
Moncrief, 2004, p. 158). The states also differ in degree of party competition. Florida is 
much less competitive than the other states (Bibby & Holbrook, 2004, p. 88).  
 Finally, the states differ considerably in their social characteristics: population, 
income, and education.  For example, among our six states, Illinois and South Carolina 
are the polar opposites in population size, per capita income, and proportion of adults 
with a baccalaureate degree or higher (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005).   
Data gathering and analysis. Our analysis is based on interviews in each state 
and on examinations of the documentary record in the form of public agency reports, 
academic books and articles, doctoral dissertations, and newspaper articles. 
 Table 2 lists the number and types of interviews that we conducted with various 
types of political actors: state and local higher education officials, state legislators and 
their staff, governors and their advisors, business leaders, and academics, consultants, and 
other observers of policymaking on performance funding in these six states. The 
interviews were semi-structured. We used a standard protocol but adapted questions to 
the circumstances of a particular interviewee and to content that emerged in the course of 




  FL  IL  MO  SC  TN  WA 
State higher education officials  10  8  4  5  6  6 
Higher education institution officials  8  10  4  7  5  5 
Legislators and staff  3  2  5  4  1  6 
Governors and advisors  3  3  3  1  1  2 
Other state government officials  1           
Business leaders  2  1  2  3  1  1 
Other (e.g., consultants, researchers)    1  2  5  4  2 
Total  27  25  20  25  18  22 
                                                 
3 Some of the interviews in Florida and Illinois were conducted as part of a study funded by the Sloan 





 Almost all of the interviews were transcribed, coded, and entered into the NVivo 
qualitative data analysis software system. We also entered into NVivo and coded our 
documentary materials if they were in a format that allowed this. The coding began with 
a pre-established list of codes, focusing on the content of performance funding systems, 
the actors and beliefs and motives supportive of or opposed to performance funding, and 
contextual events such as state budget problems or changes in control of the government, 
that were hypothesized to affect the likelihood that performance funding would be put on 
the government decision agenda and adopted. However, we added new codes and 
changed existing ones as we proceeded with our interviews and documentary analysis.   
 To analyze the data, we ran coding inquiries in NVivo to find all references in the 
interviews and documentary materials to particular actors, beliefs and motives, or 
contextual events. We used these references to construct analytic tables to compare 
different references to the same actor, motive, or event. This allowed us to analyze to 
what degree our evidence was converging on certain findings and whether divergences 
were due to the fact that different respondents occupied different social locations that 
might influence their perceptions. When we found major discrepancies in perception, we 
conducted additional interviews to resolve these differences.  
1.2 Moving Past the Prevailing Perspective on the Origins of Performance Funding 
 Our explanation of the rise of performance funding in six states both converges 
and diverges with the prevailing perspective on the rise of performance funding. The 
existing research literature on the origins of performance funding highlights the following 
conditions as playing a role in adoption of performance funding: the coincidence of a 
revenue/cost squeeze on elected government officials, business demand for greater higher 
education efficiency and lower costs, public unhappiness with rising higher education 
costs, a strong Republican presence in state legislatures, the greater vulnerability of 
higher education to government cutbacks, the rising capacity of state governments to 
collect detailed information on colleges, a growing belief in the inadequacy of traditional 
mechanisms of quality evaluation, and the absence of a consolidated governing board 
(Alexander, 2000; Burke, 2002a; McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006; Rhoades & Sporn, 
2002; Ruppert, 1995; Zumeta, 2001).  





accountability is correct on a number of points but that it also misses several important 
elements. Our analysis of the origins of performance funding in six states does find that 
the following factors posited by the prevailing perspective were at work: the revenue/cost 
squeeze on elected government officials, business demand for greater higher education 
efficiency and lower costs, and a rising Republican presence in state legislatures. 
Moreover, while we did not find evidence that the rising capacity of state governments to 
collect detailed information on colleges was a conscious factor in the rise of performance 
funding, it is a plausible factor since virtually all the states we analyzed were improving 
their data-gathering capacities at the time they adopted performance funding.   
However, we see little evidence that public unhappiness with rising higher 
education costs and growing belief in the inadequacy of traditional mechanisms of quality 
evaluation were significant factors in the rise of performance funding in our six states. 
More importantly, we identify a variety of actors and beliefs and motives that the 
prevailing perspective does not address. The most important are champions of 
performance funding from within higher education itself. It was not just legislators, 
governors, and business that pushed for performance funding. State higher education 
coordinating boards in five of our six states and community colleges in three pushed 
strongly for performance funding. They viewed performance funding systems that were 
designed by higher education itself as a way to secure new funds and increased 
legitimacy for higher education and to forestall the possibility of the imposition of 
unwelcome forms of performance funding by state elected officials.   
We also part company with the prevailing perspective in calling attention to the 
opponents of performance funding. While they did not stop performance funding from 
being established in these six states, their opposition later played an important role in the 
cessation of performance funding in several of these states (Dougherty & Natow, 2009). 
The primary opponents were state universities, animated principally by beliefs that 
performance funding provided state elected officials with an excuse to cut or keep down 
regular state appropriations for higher education, undercut the autonomy of higher 
education institutions, and failed to make necessary distinctions among higher education 
institutions according to their different missions.  





funding of policy learning and political opportunities, factors that are not discussed in 
sufficient detail by the prevailing perspective. With regard to policy learning, we found 
evidence in three of our six states that actors moved to advocate performance funding as 
they encountered limitations to the effectiveness of less intrusive forms of performance 
accountability, such as performance reporting and incentive funding.  
With regard to political opportunities, the advocates of performance funding were 
aided in putting this policy on the decision agenda of state governments by what the 
Policy Entrepreneurship perspective calls “policy windows” and the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework calls “shocks.” One has been identified by the existing literature on the 
politics of performance funding: a rising proportion of Republicans in the legislature 
(McLendon et al., 2006). However, other important political openings were a change in 
the party controlling the governorship, an antitax mood among the electorate, and 
spillover from other policy subsystems in the form of proposals for performance funding 
in the K-12 policy arena in a state.  
 In this report, we attend to many of the factors mentioned above—such as the role 
of actors’ beliefs, policy learning, and political openings—because of the guidance we 
received from theories of the policy process, particularly the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and the Policy Entrepreneurship perspective 
(Mintrom & Norman, 2009). Used in conjunction with one another, these theories help us 
identify important features of the politics of performance funding that the extant literature 
on the origins of performance funding misses or gives insufficient weight.  
 We turn now to examining the origins of performance funding in each of our six 
states, arrayed from earlier to later in date of enactment: Tennessee, Missouri, Florida, 
South Carolina, Washington, and Illinois. We conclude by summarizing the main patterns 
across these six states of supporters and opponents, motivating beliefs, and political 
openings shaping the actions of the supporters. We will also draw conclusions about the 






Adopted in 1979 following a five-year pilot period, Tennessee’s performance 
funding program was the first of its kind, and our research reveals that it was developed 
and refined almost entirely within the state’s higher education community. In the 
following, we describe the actors, beliefs and motivations, and background context 
involved in the adoption of performance funding in Tennessee. 
2.1 The Structure of Performance Funding in Tennessee  
Originally dubbed “the Instructional Evaluation Schedule” (Ewell, 1994, p. 85; 
Levy, 1986, p. 20), Tennessee’s performance funding system began as a pilot program in 
1974 (Banta, 1986; Bogue, 1980; Levy, 1986). Foundation funding was obtained to 
support the pilot (Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 3, 4, 10; see also Banta, Rudolph, Van 
Dyke, & Fisher, 1996; Bogue, 2002; Burke & Serban, 1998; Levy, 1986). During the 
pilot, some public institutions volunteered to take part in the development of performance 
funding indicators and measures and make suggestions about how the program should 
work. These institutions’ experience in the pilot led to the development of the formal 
performance funding policy that was applied to all of the state’s public institutions five 
years later (Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 10a).  
The Tennessee Higher Education Commission adopted performance funding for 
the state’s public two- and four-year higher education institutions in 1979 (Banta, 1986; 
Banta et al., 1996; Bogue, 2002; Ewell, 1994; Levy, 1986; Noland, Dandridge-Johnson, 
& Skolits, 2004). Funds were first allocated to institutions using performance funding in 
fiscal year 1980–81 (Authors’ Interview TN #10a). Under that system, higher education 
institutions could earn up to 2% of their annual state appropriations for achieving certain 
goals based on five performance indicators, each of which was worth 20 out of 100 points 
(Banta et al., 1996; Bogue & Dandridge-Johnson, 2009; Ewell, 1994; Levy, 1986).4 The 
original indicators and their point allocations were as follows (Banta, 1986, pp. 123–128; 
Bogue, 1980; Bogue & Dandridge-Johnson, 2009): 
                                                 
4 Performance funding was designed with an “improvement” focus so that each institution was competing 
with itself for the 2%, not with other institutions. Institutions were told that performance funding was 
voluntary and they did not have to participate. Performance funds allocated to institutions could be used for 





1. Program accreditation: The proportion of eligible 
programs in the institution’s inventory that are accredited 
(20 points). 
2. Student major field performance: Student performance in 
major fields as assessed by examinations that have 
normative standards for state, regional, or national referent 
groups (20 points). 
3. Student general education performance: Student 
performance in general education as assessed by a 
nationally normed exam such as the ACT-COMP 
examination (20 points). 
4. Evaluation of instructional programs: Evaluative surveys 
of instructional programs or services for a representative 
sample of current students, recent alumni, or community 
members or employers (20 points). 
5. Evaluation of academic programs by peer review teams 
of scholars from institutions outside state and/or practicing 
professionals in a field (20 points). 
In the years following, the performance indicators changed. Some were added, 
others were dropped, and some were measured in new ways. Additionally, the percentage 
of funding that institutions could earn based on performance increased from 2% to 5.45% 
(see Bogue & Dandridge-Johnson, 2009; Dougherty & Natow, 2010). However, 
Tennessee’s performance funding system has exhibited a high degree of stability overall.5  
2.2 Patterns of Support and Abstention 
The Tennessee higher education community was actively involved in the 
development of the state’s performance funding program, with the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission (THEC) and institutional representatives from each public 
college and university leading the effort to develop the program. Legislators, the 
governor, and the business community played a much lesser direct role in the program’s 
                                                 
5 For a description of these changes, see Bogue and Dandridge-Johnson (2009). For an analysis of the 
causes of the relative stability of the Tennessee performance funding system over time, see Dougherty and 






creation; however, these actors played secondary roles that were important background 
features in the development of performance funding in Tennessee. There was no 
organized opposition. Though many institutional representatives were skeptical of 
performance funding, they did not voice open opposition or organize against it.    
Supporters. Our research shows that the creators and main champions of  
Tennessee’s performance funding program were administrators within the state’s Higher 
Education Commission (Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 12; see also Bogue, 
2002; Folger, 1989). One of our respondents, a Tennessee higher education insider, 
described THEC administrators as “the chief architects” of Tennessee’s performance 
funding program (Authors’ Interview TN #1). Additionally, a former state-level higher 
education official told us, “This policy was not shoved down our throats by a legislature. 
It was not imposed in any way. It was something that [THEC] developed from within” 
(Authors’ Interview TN #2).  
Significant parts of the higher education community joined the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission in favor of performance funding (Folger, 1989). To help design 
the system, the Commission created a statewide advisory committee composed of staff 
members of the two governing boards, institutional staff, academic and financial 
specialists, and members of the education and finance committees of the state legislature 
(Authors’ Interviews; Bogue, 2002; Levy, 1986). A former public university 
administrator noted: “There were representatives from each of the major systems, 
University of Tennessee being one, and the Tennessee Board of Regents the other, and 
those representatives suggested how performance funding might be put together” 
(Authors’ Interview TN #1). In addition, institutional representatives served on initial 
advisory committees and helped THEC to develop the details of the performance funding 
policy (Authors’ Interviews TN #2, 12). Finally, a large number of the state’s public 
institutions volunteered to participate in the initial pilot program (Authors’ Interviews TN 
#1, 2; Levy, 1986, pp. 16–17).6  
Beliefs uniting the supporters. The supporters of performance funding were 
united by a certain number of beliefs held in common. These included the importance of 
                                                 
6 Early involvement of colleges and universities in the development of performance funding has been cited 
by some of our respondents as a reason for the program’s longevity (Authors’ Interviews TN #2, 3, 12; see 





making higher education more accountable and raising its quality. By doing both, 
Tennessee public higher education institutions could both make a stronger claim for 
public funding and preempt the possibility of accountability systems that they would find 
distasteful.  
Many within the Commission and the higher education institutions shared the 
growing national perception that public agencies—including public colleges and 
universities—should be more accountable to the general public and responsive to 
changing social needs (Levy, 1986, p. 14; see also Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 11, 12). A 
community college official explained that the people of Tennessee:  
knew the technology age was coming. They knew that the 
age of skilled workers and professional employees was 
coming, and factory was going away, and so they needed to 
tool up for that. So there was pressure both on the public 
and from professionals to change the focus of higher 
education.  
Performance funding was seen as a means to address these concerns by improving 
the quality of Tennessee public higher education institutions (Authors’ Interviews TN # 
10a, 12, 15; see also Ewell, 1994, p. 86). Advocates of performance funding believed that 
the existing enrollment-driven funding formula did not sufficiently address quality 
improvement (Authors’ Interview TN #10a).  
The supporters of performance funding also believed it was a way to justify 
increased higher education appropriations in a time when enrollments were not rising as 
fast as before (Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 3; see also Bogue, 2002; Ewell, 1990; Folger, 
1989). According to one insider, THEC administrators “decided that they could use a 
performance funding mechanism to convince the legislature that our campuses, public 
universities, and colleges in the state were accountable, and therefore deserved a 
supplement to the budget” (Authors’ Interview TN #1). In addition, a former state-level 
higher education administrator noted that: 
Tennessee was expecting to see downturns in budgets for 
higher education, a flattening of enrollment growth, and 
their thought was, “How can we demonstrate performance 






Finally, the supporters of performance funding believed that the policy would be a 
means to prevent externally imposed accountability measures, which THEC thought 
might be enacted if the higher education community did not implement an accountability 
mechanism of its own (Authors’ Interviews TN #2, 12; see also Bogue, 2002). According 
to a former community college official, before performance funding was adopted in 
Tennessee: 
The highest level of government said, “Higher education 
will improve or we will improve it for you.” I think that’s 
what woke everybody up. We better fix this ourselves in 
higher education or legislature is going to pass some laws 
that make us do it.  
A former state-level higher education official said that THEC administrators did 
not believe that an external accountability imposition was “imminent,” but they “didn’t 
want it to become imminent,” and they took their “own initiative and to show that [higher 
education was] willing to be accountable” (Authors’ Interview TN #2).  
Supportive but not active. Elected officials and the business community did not 
push for performance funding. However, their demand for greater accountability by 
government agencies provided the context within which the Tennessee Higher Education 
Commission developed its performance funding proposal.  
Elected officials. In Tennessee, elected officials (i.e., the governor and 
legislature) were essentially uninvolved in the development of performance funding 
(Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 4, 10). According to one insider, the performance funding 
program “was the brainchild of [THEC administrators], and then they managed to sell it 
to the legislative committees that were responsible for funding higher education.”   
But the fact that elected officials did not have direct involvement in the creation 
of the performance funding program in Tennessee does not mean that the legislative and 
executive branches did not influence the creation of performance funding. At the very 
least, if the legislature and governor had opposed performance funding, the program 
would not have succeeded; performance funds were embedded in appropriations in the 
state budget bill, which had to pass the legislature and be signed by the governor 
(Authors’ Interviews TN #4, 10). In addition, legislative and gubernatorial demands for 





advocates of performance funding (Authors’ Interviews TN #12; Bogue & Troutt, 1977). 
A community college official told us:  
We had relied forever on the familiar enrollment formula, 
and it’s like counting warm bodies on the fourteenth day, 
and that was changing toward a performance-based view of 
funding, and all that discussion was going on in the general 
public; in the newspapers. … And that trickles through the 
legislature and then ultimately ends up in the governor’s 
office, and before you know it they’ve got a commission 
called the Tennessee Higher Education Commission to deal 
with it.  
Finally, some legislators did play a more direct role. The THEC’s statewide 
advisory committee for performance funding did include some legislators (Bogue & 
Brown, 1982, p. 124; Levy, 1986, p. 15). 
Business. Like elected officials, members of the business community were not 
directly involved in the development of performance funding in Tennessee, except 
insofar as there were business people on the Tennessee Commission of Higher Education 
(Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 2). One of our respondents who had been involved in the 
development of the state’s performance funding program told us that “the business 
community just ignored it, because it wasn’t publicized very much” (Authors’ Interview 
TN #1). This stands in contrast to the states of Florida, South Carolina, and Washington, 
where the business communities openly supported performance accountability for higher 
education.  
However, it is worth noting that business leaders served on the Higher Education 
Commission, which was the entity that created the performance funding program 
(Authors’ Interview TN #10). Also, our findings suggest that the need to provide a skilled 
workforce for business and industry may have been one of the motivations for adopting 
performance funding (Authors’ Interview TN #12). According to a former community 
college official: 
I think the call was for “improve your quality of higher 
education to benefit the industry and commerce, the private 
sector growth of the state.” So there was a concern at that 
point that Tennessee had to move into this nearly emerging 





Thus, although the business community did not directly advocate in favor of 
performance funding in Tennessee, business leaders and business concerns about quality 
and a highly skilled workforce were important considerations in the program’s 
development.  
Latent opposition. While a sizable number of individuals and institutions in 
 higher education supported performance funding, many others did not. However, this 
opposition was not organized or even particularly vocal (Authors’ Interviews TN #2, 4, 
10, 12; see also Bogue & Brown, 1982; Bogue & Troutt, 1977; Folger, 1989; Levy, 
1986).  
One of the reasons for institutions’ opposition was the belief that performance-
based funds were coming at the expense of dollars that might have come from the regular 
enrollment-based funding formula. Many felt that the formula was not fully funded and 
questioned why the state would move forward with a “new” performance element when 
the formula was not providing adequate funds to support enrollment growth and quality. 
This perception was due in part to the fact that the funding for performance funding was 
initially embedded within the regular state appropriation for higher education and was not 
a separate item. Moreover, at the time the Commission on Higher Education requested 
appropriations for performance funding, the governor had cut the request for enrollment-
based funding (Authors’ Interview TN #10a; Bogue, 1980, p. 6; Levy, 1986, p. 21).  
Higher education organizations also expressed concerns about the vagueness of 
some indicators and the fact that some measures were not tailored to the unique role of 
community colleges and some graduate programs (Authors’ Interview TN #1; Levy, 
1986).7 Moreover, according to one of our respondents, performance funding: 
goes against the grain of academics and faculty to think that 
there is something that is supposed to be showing quality 
and [that] it’s test scores of students, [because] test scores 
are … so heavily influenced by prior learning so you’re 
measuring what the students brought in with them.  
But despite their unhappiness about performance funding, the institutions that 
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disliked the program did not openly oppose its development (Authors’ Interviews TN 
#10, 12). As one former community college official said, 
Faculty and general staff and business officers and people 
like that just were looking at it like just another government 
program. Just another administrative hoop to jump through. 
And I wouldn’t call it so much as opposition as I would [a] 
folded arms, harrumph attitude. …  They were suspicious 
of it being another government-imposed procedure or 
administrative process that wouldn’t necessarily benefit 
them. But [I wouldn’t] say there was any opposition in 
terms of banging the desk or anything. None of that.  
Another higher education insider told us that institutions’ lack of vocal opposition 
was perhaps because many institutional representatives did not believe that performance 
funding would actually go forward (Authors’ Interview TN #10).  
2.3 The Process of Establishing Performance Funding 
The Tennessee Higher Education Commission moved in a deliberate fashion to 
develop performance funding. The Executive Director of the Higher Education 
Commission, John Folger, first gathered together some commission staffers in 1974 to 
develop the effort. Aided by foundation funding, this group pilot tested the performance 
funding system over five years.8 The Higher Education Commission received funding 
from the federal Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education, the Ford and 
Kellogg foundations, and an anonymous foundation in Tennessee to finance the pilot of 
the performance funding program (Authors’ Interviews TN #1, 3, 4, 10; see also Banta et 
al., 1996; Bogue, 1980; Bogue, 2002; Burke & Serban, 1998; Folger, 1989; Levy, 1986; 
Serban, 1997).  
To help design the system, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission gathered 
opinions from educational experts across the country and created a statewide advisory 
committee composed of university governing board staff members, staff from colleges 
and universities, academic and financial specialists, and members of the education and 
finance committees of the state legislature (Authors’ Interview TN #10a; Bogue, 2002; 
Burke & Serban, 1998; Levy, 1986). In fact, the staff of the state’s two governing 
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boards—the Tennessee Board of Regents and the University of Tennessee system—
worked closely with THEC in the development of performance funding (Authors’ 
Interviews TN # 2, 3). Members of the governing boards served on one of the initial 
performance funding advisory committees (Authors’ Interview TN #2). In addition, the 
Commission invited the state’s public higher education institutions to submit proposals to 
develop “a set of performance indicators reflecting the identity of an institution” and 
“provide at least some very tentative thinking about how performance on indicators might 
be rewarded through the appropriation process” (as cited in Levy, 1986, p. 16). The 
Commission received proposals from 19 of the 21 public institutions and approved 12 of 
them. As the pilot projects were implemented, THEC staff visited the campuses to 
observe and provide advice for the projects (Bogue, 1980; Bogue & Troutt, 1977; Bogue 
& Troutt, 1978; Levy, 1986).  In the process, the Commission staff learned of the 
importance to institutions of performance indicators that were tailored to institutional 
missions. The Commission also found out how important it was to institutions to have a 
funding system that would not lead institutions to receive less funding than they would on 
an enrollment basis if they performed poorly (Bogue & Troutt, 1977, pp. 7–8).  
2.4 Policy Learning 
Tennessee did not have the advantage of learning from previous efforts to 
establish performance funding from higher education, since it was the first state to 
establish such a system. However, previous policy experiences did play a role in shaping 
the views of the advocates of performance funding. Their interest in performance funding 
was stimulated in part by a growing perception that enrollment-based formula funding 
had its limits. There was growing criticism inside and outside higher education that 
enrollment-based formula funding provided no incentive for improving instructional 
performance but rather encouraged institutions to simply pursue increased enrollments 
(Bogue & Brown, 1982, p. 124; Bogue & Troutt, 1977, pp. 1–2; Serban, 1997, p. 91).  
2.5 Agenda Setting 
Certain contextual events in the 1970s appear to have spurred or facilitated the 
efforts of the advocates of performance funding in Tennessee. First, performance funding 





great resistance to higher taxes (Levy, 1986, pp. 13–15; Authors’ Interview TN #12). For 
example, in 1973, California passed Proposition 13, which put limits on how much state 
taxes could rise (Levy, 1986). In addition, Tennessee in the 1970s elected two Republican 
governors with accountability priorities and the legislature had begun to base “budget 
requests” on “program effectiveness” (Burke & Serban, 1998, p. 45; Serban, 1997).  
2.6 Summary  
Tennessee’s performance funding program, established in 1979, was the first 
performance funding system for higher education in the country. Tennessee’s 
performance funding system began as a pilot program in 1974, and the details were 
worked out over the next five years through active collaboration between the Tennessee 
Commission on Higher Education and representatives from the public colleges and 
universities. Legislators, the governor, and the business community did not play a direct 
role in the program’s creation. However, their demands for greater accountability by 
government agencies, for education reform, and for an education system that produced a 
highly qualified workforce provided the context within which the Tennessee Higher 
Education Commission developed its performance funding proposal. There was no 
organized opposition. Although many institutional representatives were skeptical of 
performance funding, they did not voice open opposition or organize against it. The rise 
of performance funding reflected both policy learning on the part of higher education 
actors concerned about higher education finance and the occurrence of contextual events 
such as the budget troubles of the late 1970s and the election of governors and legislators 
who valued greater accountability on the part of government agencies. 
 
3. Missouri  
Missouri was one of the first states to develop performance funding for higher 
education. It created a system in 1993 that took effect in fiscal year 1993–94 (Stein, 2002, 
p. 113; Stein & Fajen, 1995, pp. 82–83). This system attracted a lot of attention from 
policymakers and analysts nationwide because it had been carefully designed and seemed 
likely to last a long time (Burke, 2002a; Ewell, 1994; Schmidt, 2002a, 2002b). Below, we 





3.1 The Structure of Performance Funding in Missouri 
The performance funding system (Funding for Results) began in fiscal year 1994 
with a $3 million appropriation to be applied to the performance of public four-year 
colleges. The following year, $4.3 million was appropriated for the four-year colleges, 
and $500,000 was added for the two-year colleges. In subsequent years, funding went up 
and down, peaking in fiscal year 1999 at $11 million for the four-year colleges and $2.3 
million for the two-year colleges (Stein, 2002, pp. 127–128). However, the Funding for 
Results (FFR) program failed to receive state funding after fiscal year 2002 and 
disappeared (Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, forthcoming), although performance funding 
requests were sent forward in the higher education budget requests sent to the governor 
and the General Assembly in subsequent years.  
 The Funding for Results program began with three indicators, but these eventually 
flowered into six for the community colleges and eight for the universities. Four 
indicators were common to both types of institutions: “freshman success rates,” “success 
of underrepresented groups,” “performance of graduates,” and “successful transfer.” The 
community colleges had two additional, sector-specific indicators: “degree/certificate 
productivity” and “successful job placement.” The four-year colleges and universities, 
meanwhile, had four additional sector-specific indicators: “quality of new undergraduate 
students,” “quality of new graduate students,” “quality of prospective teachers,” and 
“attainment of graduation goals.” Two of the early indicators were dropped in later years: 
“assessment of graduates” and “degrees in critical disciplines” (Naughton, 2004; Stein, 
2002). 
3.2 Patterns of Support and Abstention 
Performance funding for higher education in Missouri was supported by a 
coalition involving the Coordinating Board for Higher Education, Governors Mel 
Carnahan and John Ashcroft, and Democratic legislative leaders. While it was not 
formally opposed by any organized group, there were pockets of resistance both within 
and outside higher education. Individual business leaders were supportive, but the 
business associations were quiet. However, business did exert considerable indirect 
influence. Finally, higher education institutions ranged from mildly supportive to 





these patterns of support and abstention below.  
Supporters. The main coalition in support of performance funding was  
comprised of the Coordinating Board for Higher Education, Governor Mel Carnahan, and 
Democratic legislative leaders (Stein, 2002, p. 119). Also playing significant roles were 
Governor John Ashcroft and external consultants, including the National Center for 
Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS). We briefly review their roles below 
and then examine the beliefs that united this advocacy coalition.  
 Virtually all those we interviewed stated that the Coordinating Board—most 
particularly, its top leadership—played the most important role in conceiving and pushing 
performance funding. Especially singled out were Commissioner of Higher Education 
Charles McClain (1989–1995) and a senior administrator, Robert Stein. They had 
conceived of performance funding and then championed the idea with the governor, 
legislators, and institutional leaders (Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 16; 
also see Naughton, 2004; Stein, 2002; Stein & Fajen, 1995).  
 Governors Mel Carnahan (1993–2000) and, to a lesser extent, John Ashcroft 
(1985–1993) were key supporters of performance funding. Carnahan was the first 
governor to recommend a budget appropriation for performance funding in his fiscal year 
1994 budget message (Stein, 2002, p. 113; Stein & Fajen, 1995, pp. 82–83). Furthermore, 
in his budget message for the fiscal year 1995, Carnahan highlighted Funding for Results 
by placing it under a separate budget heading, “Requiring Performance and Rewarding 
Success” (Stein, 2002, p. 114). Ashcroft had also supported the concept of rewarding 
institutions based on student performance (Cobbs, 1989; Stein, 2002, pp. 109, 111–112; 
Thomson, 1991). However, he did not support an actual appropriation of performance 
funding dollars, as recommended in 1991 by the Coordinating Board for Higher 
Education for the fiscal year 1993 budget (Naughton, 2004, p. 95; also see Authors’ 
Interviews MO #1, 2, 6).  
 Democratic legislative leaders played a key role in the formation of the Missouri 
Business and Education Partnership Council that recommended incentive funding for 
higher education and a 1991 referendum proposal (Proposition B) that would have 
mandated it (Ganey, 1991; Missouri Business and Education Partnership Commission, 





funding, as they were in states such as Florida, South Carolina, and Washington 
(Authors’ Interviews MO #6, 10).  
 Rounding out this advocacy coalition were outside consultants associated with the 
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems (NCHEMS).  They were 
involved in the design of Proposition B, including its provision to reward colleges and 
universities for each minority student they graduated (Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 2, 10; 
Aguillard, 1990).  
Common beliefs. The coalition advocating performance funding was united by 
certain beliefs they held in common. One was the importance of getting more state funds 
for higher education. The second was the importance of increasing higher education 
efficiency by reducing unnecessary duplication in the provision of higher education 
programs. In addition, the Coordinating Board was animated by the belief in the 
importance of improving the quality of higher education. In each case, performance 
funding was seen as a very useful way of securing these benefits.   
 The Coordinating Board, Governors Carnahan and Ashcroft, and Democratic 
legislative leaders wanted to increase state funding for higher education. But this was 
notably difficult given the state’s antitax mood and a constitutional amendment passed in 
1980 (the Hancock Amendment) that limits how much the state can raise taxes (Hembree, 
2004).  Performance funding was seen as a way to legitimate an increase in state funding 
because of its promise to make higher education more efficient and effective (Authors’ 
Interviews MO #2, 3, 7, 12).  For example, a state higher education official argued: 
It’s not very dramatic to get up and talk about how many 
library books you have or the input measurements. A 
person sitting on the Appropriations Committee [is 
interested in] how many are graduating and what kind of 
citizens that you are producing and things of that type. All 
of the evidence that one can accumulate to show that here 
are the things that are happening as a result of the education 
that is going on on the campuses, it makes a very powerful 
and persuasive case for additional funding. … I just thought 
it was a creative way to try and get to tell our message in a 
little more measurable way and put a little meat on the 
message so it wouldn’t just be high rhetoric that tells how 
wonderful it is if you will support higher education and 
how much of a difference it will make in our economy and 





we’re from the Show Me state and there must be a reason 
for some of those mottos.  
 The second belief animating the coalition in favor of performance funding was the 
importance of making higher education run more efficiently and that performance 
funding was a useful way of doing this (Missouri Coordinating Board for Higher 
Education, 1992; Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 16). For example, a state 
university official noted:  
There was a move on a lot of institutions in Missouri to 
expand and to try to be like each other and compete with 
each other. … They were doing things like setting up 
satellite operations in each other’s backyard; universities 
that … grew out of normal school systems and then became 
regional universities were now wanting to be research 
universities. … That was a great concern to the 
commissioner [of higher education]. … It would have been 
prohibitively expensive for all institutions to try to expand 
their missions. … What I see the [Coordinating Board for 
Higher Education] was able to do with performance-based 
funding was to provide incentive for institutions to … do 
the right things or to stay within their mission.  
 Governor Carnahan and legislative leaders shared this concern about finding ways 
of keeping down the operating costs of higher education. As a university official noted,  
Carnahan’s motives too, I think, were pretty 
straightforward. … We have too many publicly supported 
institutions of higher education in this state. We spread our 
dollars very thin. … So the governor, regardless of who it 
is, is going to hear a lot of concerns about funding of public 
higher education, and I think this in part was probably a 
reasonable way for a governor to respond. “Okay, let’s see 
how good we are, how we can make ourselves better, and 
can we make our few dollars go further and be more 
effective.”  
Similarly, legislative leaders were attracted to the promise of performance funding in 
reducing duplication in higher education (Authors’ Interviews MO #3, 7, 10, 16; 
Thomson, 1992). A Democratic legislative leader who served on the Missouri Business 





Mission-drift is what we were trying to prevent. … We 
were working on missions and each of the institutions was 
to define as clearly as possible the mission of the institution. 
… We attempted to eliminate mission-drift as much as 
possible because of duplication. … And the institutions 
were getting funding based on the efficacy of their missions 
and their attempt to prevent mission-drift.  
 Thirdly, the Coordinating Board believed in the efficacy of performance funding 
in improving the quality and effectiveness of higher education (Authors’ Interviews MO 
#1, 2). As a Coordinating Board official noted,  
The overriding concern was to try to focus on quality at the 
state level. The temptation—particularly with institutions 
that have a fairly decent Chamber of Commerce so to speak 
—[is] … to want to boost the fall enrollment and to get 
state appropriations based on the enrollment as of October 
without regard to whether or not the students succeed or 
whether or not they stay and graduate. … One of the ways 
that it occurred to me that one might try to change the 
conversation slightly would be to say we’re going to have 
some measurements that relate to the academic part of the 
house and the quality part rather than just the quantity part. 
… It was a mechanism to provide an incentive to look at 
the outputs in higher ed as well as the inputs such as FTE 
[full time equivalent] and student enrollment. … I knew 
that it was not possible to get funding at 100% or even a 
large percent, but we started and said, “Well let’s see if we 
can get a margin of excellence, if you will, and fund that 
5% or 6% margin based on some agreed-upon academic 
outputs.”  
Supportive but not active. Elements of the business community were supportive 
of performance funding—for example, there were business members on the blue-ribbon 
commissions that called for incentive funding or performance funding (Missouri Business 
and Education Partnership Commission, 1991; Missouri Coordinating Board for Higher 
Education, 1992). However, none of the business associations formally came out in favor 
of performance funding (Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 19). As a state higher 
education official noted: 
 I’m not sure the Chamber really ever got it. … I’m not 





… We had individual corporate types that might have been 
curators [members of the board] at the University of 
Missouri for example. … So you had the individual 
support, the individual institutional support, but nothing on 
an organized basis from the Chamber of Commerce that I 
recall.  
 Even if business was not mobilized in favor, it could be argued that it still exerted 
a powerful indirect role.9 Its possible resistance to funding increases for higher education 
unless they were coupled with accountability requirements shaped the strategy of the 
advocates of more funding (Authors’ Interview MO #10). As a prominent state legislator 
noted,  
You’ve got [a] group of people looking for money. … 
You’ve got this maybe coincidental group of conservative 
business entities who as a resistance to additional funding. 
… they want to talk about things like accountability. … So 
you know, performance-based funding was just kind of 
brought to us by consultants as a way to pacify various 
conservative groups.  
Ambivalent and not involved. Higher education institutions ranged between 
mildly supportive to decidedly negative about performance funding, but initially they did 
not get involved politically in the passage of performance funding (Authors’ Interviews 
MO #2, 3, 6, 7; Stein, 2002, p. 115). As a state higher education official noted,  
In my perception, in the beginning years, there was a lot of 
resistance to FFR from the presidents. They were not 
overly enamored with it … because it was intrusive. It was 
a perception that they were going to have to earn some of 
their money out of an era where [it was felt], “We do good 
things, we’re entitled and we deserve increases. You’re 
encroaching on … our increases.” You know that whole 
tension between the days of “We do good work. Put the 
money on the stump and go away and give it to us because 
we deserve it.”  
 To be sure, the medium-prestige institutions and the community colleges were 
somewhat supportive, though they had their criticisms of the original formulation of 
performance funding (Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 2, 3). However, the University of 
                                                 





Missouri was decidedly negative (Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 7; Stein, 2002, p. 115). In 
fact, in a 1994 letter to the Commissioner of Higher Education, Chancellor Charles 
Kiesler of the University of Missouri–Columbia urged reconsideration of the whole 
Funding for Results approach, labeling it “basically flawed” (Stein, 2002, p. 115).   
 Pulling the higher education institutions toward supporting performance funding 
was an awareness that it might be the necessary price for securing more state funding 
(Authors’ Interviews MO #2, 10; Naughton, 2004, p. 69). As a prominent state legislator 
noted,  
I don’t know if I’d say [the universities did] flat out oppose 
it [performance funding], but they certainly had problems 
with it. I think they also wanted money, too. … Recalling 
my conversations with the faculty, they were 
philosophically opposed to it, but they also were listening 
to people like myself about the political realities and the 
things we needed to do if we ever were going to get any 
more money. … I think a lot of people … recognized the 
other goodies that it [performance funding] brought along.  
 However, this awareness of the political benefits of performance funding was 
counterbalanced by reservations on the part of higher education institutions about 
performance funding. Above all, there was a feeling that performance funding brought an 
unwanted and illegitimate infringement on academic autonomy (Authors’ Interviews MO 
#1, 2, 7; Aguillard, 1992; Stein, 2002, p. 116). A university official observed:  
Initially, the University of Missouri opposed it mainly on 
the basis that … the funding was based on a general 
education competency test and on major field exams. … A 
lot of people felt that we should not let politicians and the 
legislature get involved in what we teach.  
 In addition to this rather widespread feeling, there were other more localized 
objections. Some institutions voiced concern that performance funding came at the 
expense of increases in their regular funding and was just one more bureaucratic 
requirement superimposed on an already underfunded, overworked faculty (Stein, 2002, 
p. 116; Stein & Fajen, 1995, pp. 86–88; Authors’ Interview MO #16). There was also 
concern that performance funding imposed a one-size-fits-all system on higher education, 





missions (Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 3, 7). This was particularly the concern of the 
community colleges, who felt the indicators were tailored too much to the realities of the 
four-year colleges and too little to those of community colleges with their commitment to 
open enrollment and student progress that did not necessarily require graduation 
(Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 3). 
3.3 The Process of Establishing the Funding for Results Program  
The heads of the Coordinating Board for Higher Education, especially 
Commissioner of Higher Education Charles McClain, were the key political 
entrepreneurs in the development of performance funding in Missouri (Authors’ 
Interviews MO #1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 16; Stein & Fajen, 1995, p. 80). A university 
official observed:  
It was [Charles McClain’s] idea, and he based it in part on 
his success at what became Truman State University up in 
Kirksville.  … A value-added approach to the evaluation of 
the academic program. He basically had students come in 
having taken the ACT or the SAT and he would regive that 
test at the end of the second, third year. … So leaving that 
role, he came to be the Commissioner of Higher Education, 
and Charles is not one to just let things rock along. … One 
of the initiatives that he started was this performance-based 
funding.  
 As noted above, McClain had developed a much celebrated academic assessment 
program in the 1980s that brought national attention to Northeast Missouri State 
University (later called Truman State) (Ewell, 1991; Serban, 1997, p. 81; Stein & Fajen, 
1995, p. 79). In 1989, he became Commissioner of Higher Education (1989–1995) and 
directed the staff of the Coordinating Board for Higher Education (CBHE) to begin to 
explore the concept of performance funding with all public institutions. Institutions were 
invited to work with CBHE staff in developing the guiding principles (Serban, 1997, p. 
94; Stein, 2002, pp. 110–111; Stein & Fajen, 1995, p. 80). In 1991, McClain testified 
before the legislature, urging the importance of linking funding with results (Stein, 2002, 
p. 111). He also served on the Missouri Business and Education Partnership Commission, 
which in its 1991 report called for giving CBHE control over 2% of the state’s higher 





showed improvement in, for example, graduating students with better writing skills. The 
MBEPC report also called for $10 million to increase the graduation rates of 
economically poor students, especially minority students (Aguillard, 1991a). And in 
1992, McClain led the CBHE to form a Task Force on Critical Choices composed of 
chairs of all public college and university boards (Naughton, 2004, p. 65; Serban, 1997, 
pp. 83–84, 93–94, 115–116; Stein, 2002, p. 112; Stein & Fajen, 1995, p. 79). Among 
other things, its report called for:   
Financial incentives and rewards for performance as well as 
targeted funds to achieve focused institutional missions and 
improvements in institutional governance; such programs 
may include but are not limited to the following 
performance measures: implementing admission decisions 
appropriate to institutional missions; increasing student 
performance in general education and the major field of 
study; increasing participation and graduation of 
historically underserved populations, particularly 
minorities, as well as increasing the proportion of faculty 
and staff from historically underrepresented populations; 
increasing institutional graduation and time-to-completion 
rates, particularly in critical high-skill traces and 
disciplines; encouraging students to continue their formal 
education through transfer or post-baccalaureate study; 
developing distinctive programs and more focused 
missions; and achieving administrative efficiency goals. 
(Missouri Coordinating Board for Higher Education, 1992, 
p. 12)  
3.4 Agenda Setting 
 The efforts of the advocates of performance funding were aided by two contextual 
developments. One was the failure of Proposition B in 1991 by a two-to-one margin. It 
had proposed to sharply increase spending on both higher education and K-12 education 
by raising taxes. In addition, in the case of higher education, it mandated that: (1) each 
college develop a statement of purpose and a plan on how the statement would be put into 
action; (2) the Coordinating Board for Higher Education develop a “coordinated plan” 
specifying goals and objectives for the higher education system, a mission 
implementation plan for each higher education institutions, and accountability measures; 





funding be provided for minority student completion of 60 credits and graduation 
(Aguillard, 1991b, 1991c, 1991d; Serban, 1997, pp. 82–83; Stein, 2002, p. 111; Stein & 
Fajen, 1995, p. 79).  
 The failure of Proposition B by a two-to-one margin led state officials and many 
higher education officials to conclude that higher education could not expect to get 
additional state funding unless it could strikingly demonstrate that it was improving in its 
efficiency and effectiveness. For example, Lawrence K. Roos, interim chancellor of St. 
Louis Community College and a former Supervisor of St. Louis County, argued:  
Missouri citizens are convinced that they are not getting 
full value for their educational tax dollars; and until 
Missouri education gets its act together and our citizens 
become convinced that we are doing our job efficiently and 
effectively, we will not work our way out of our present 
predicament, as I see it. (As cited in Thomson, 1991) 
 The second contextual development was the 1992 election of Democrat Mel 
Carnahan to the governorship (1993–2000). His predecessor, Republican John Ashcroft, 
had been supportive of greater higher education funding and of performance funding. 
However, in 1991 he had not supported a budget allocation for performance funding for 
fiscal year 1993 (Naughton, 2004, p. 95; Authors’ Interviews MO #1, 2, 6). In contrast, in 
his budget message for fiscal year 1994, Carnahan called for the first state appropriation 
for performance funding, a request that the legislature accepted (Naughton, 2004, p. 68; 
Stein, 2002, p. 113; Stein & Fajen, 1995, pp. 82–83).  
3.5 Summary 
The enactment of performance funding for higher education in Missouri in 1993 
was the product of the joint efforts of the Coordinating Board for Higher Education, 
Governors Mel Carnahan and John Ashcroft, and Democratic legislative leaders. This 
coalition was united by certain beliefs held in common. One was the importance of 
getting more state funds for higher education. The second was the importance of making 
the provision of higher education more efficient. In addition, the Coordinating Board was 
animated by the belief in the importance of improving the quality of higher education. In 
each case, performance funding was seen as a very useful way of securing these benefits.   





institutions were not involved politically, although they were torn between those 
institutions that were mildly supportive and those that were decidedly negative toward 
performance funding.  
 Business was largely uninvolved directly. Though individual business leaders 
were supportive, the business associations were quiet. However, business did exert 
considerable indirect influence. Its attitude that any additional funds for higher education 
should be coupled with greater accountability demands gave further impetus to the push 
for performance funding.  
 
4. Florida 
Florida adopted two performance funding systems for higher education. 
Performance-Based Budgeting (PB2) was enacted in 1994 and continues to this day. The 
Workforce Development Education Fund (WDEF) was initiated in 1997 but ended after 
2002 (Bell, 2005; Dougherty & Natow, 2009; Florida State Board for Community 
Colleges, 1998, 2000; Pfeiffer, 1998; Wright, Dallet, & Copa, 2002; Yancey, 2002). Both 
systems applied only to community colleges. In the following, we describe in greater 
detail the structure of these two performance funding systems and then analyze their 
origins.  
4.1 Structure of the Florida Performance Funding System  
In 1994, Florida passed the Government Performance and Accountability Act, 
which was intended to move state funding of government agencies toward program 
outcomes rather than inputs. The state’s community colleges were some of the first public 
organizations to come under the purview of PB2, which went into effect for them in 
1996. The state’s four-year colleges and universities were supposed to become subject to 
PB2 some time later, but this has not happened (Bell, 2005, p. 42; Yancey, 2002, pp. 56–
57; Wright et al., 2002, pp. 144–145).  
When the 1994 Government Performance and Accountability Act was passed in 
1994 (Laws of Florida ch. 94-249), it was envisioned as a form of performance budgeting 
in which the legislature would base its funding for higher education institutions on the 





However, there was no fixed formula tying funding to specific indicators. This displeased 
key senators, who wanted a fixed formula. This led these senators to create the 
Performance Incentive Funding program in 1996 (1996–97 General Appropriations Act, 
HB 2715, Specific Appropriation 172A). This program created a specific pot of money 
that would be allocated by formula to community colleges, based on specific 
performance indicators. This new program became a part of Performance-Based 
Budgeting.  
 Initially, $12 million was appropriated for fiscal year 1996–1997. These funds 
would be distributed to community colleges at the end of the fiscal year, depending on 
their individual performances on three sets of indicators: completion of certificates and 
Associate of Arts and Associate of Science degrees ($5 million); completion of the same 
by students who are economically disadvantaged, disabled, non-English speakers or in 
ESL programs, passed state job licensure exams, or were placed in jobs in targeted 
occupations ($5 million); and Associate of Arts completers who graduated with less than 
72 attempted credit hours ($2 million) (Wright et al., 2002, pp. 144–145). Over the years, 
PB2 funding has accounted for 1% to 2% of total state appropriations for the community 
colleges. While the performance indicators have changed over time, they have continued 
to focus on degree completion, transfer to the state university system, successful passage 
of licensure exams, and securing jobs paying more than $10 an hour (Bell, 2005, pp. 39–
43, 53–54; Dougherty & Natow, 2010; Florida State Board for Community Colleges, 
1998, 2000; Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 1997; 
Wright et al., 2002, pp. 148–149, 161, 163, 165, 250–252; Yancey, 2002, pp. 56–58).  
Initiated in 1997, the Workforce Development Education Fund (WDEF) (Laws of 
Florida, ch. 93-307, SB1688) applied to the community colleges and area vocational 
centers operated by the K-12 districts.10 The WDEF operated between 1997–1998 and 
2000–2001 and then lapsed (Dougherty & Natow, 2009). At its peak, WDEF comprised 
nearly 6% of state funding for community colleges. WDEF held back 15% of an 
                                                 
10 There was a short-lived precursor called Performance Based Incentive Funding (PBIF) (Florida Statutes 
§ 239.249), which was enacted in 1994 and lasted till 1997. It allowed community colleges and public 
vocational technical centers to voluntarily take part in a program that pooled federal and state vocational 
education funds and held back 20% of those funds, with colleges and schools then betting that they could 
perform well enough to get all those funds and even more back, depending on their performance on various 
outcome measures (Bell, 2005, pp. 32, 41, 44–45, 96; Pfeiffer, 1998, p. 23; Wright et al., 2002, p. 153; 





institution’s state appropriation from the previous year for vocational and technical 
education. Institutions could then win this money back based on their performance on 
these measures: (1) number of adult basic education completions, vocational certificates, 
and vocational associates of science for students with certain characteristics 
(economically disadvantaged students, welfare recipients, the disabled, dislocated, and 
ESL); and (2) job placement of students (with institutions getting more points for 
placement in higher-paying jobs) (Bell, 2005, pp. 47, 59–60, 175–176; Florida State 
Board for Community Colleges, 1998, 2000; Pfeiffer, 1998; Wright et al., 2002, p. 163; 
Yancey, 2002, pp. 59–61).  
4.2 Patterns of Support and Opposition for Performance Funding 
 There emerged in Florida three distinct advocacy coalitions supporting 
performance funding for different reasons and one coalition opposing it. The supportive 
coalitions involved the governor, legislators, business associations, and community 
college officials. The opposing coalition centered on the public universities.  
Supporters. The supporters of performance funding were organized into three 
different coalitions. One was focused on the passage of the 1994 Government 
Performance and Accountability Act, while the other two were focused on the passage of 
the 1996 Performance Incentive Fund and the 1997 Workforce Development Education 
Act.  
The first coalition. This coalition, which was focused on the 1994 Government 
Performance and Accountability Act, was centered on the governor, legislators in the 
House, and business leaders. This coalition favored performance budgeting, in which 
state appropriations would be informed by the performance of higher education systems 
but would not be dictated by a specific formula (Authors’ Interviews FL #13, 16, 19; also 
see Berry & Flowers, 1999, pp. 585, 591, 594; Boyd & Calabro, 1996; Bradley & 
Flowers, 2001, p. 378; Florida State Board for Community Colleges, 1998, pp. 6–9; 
Tyree & Hellmich, 1995; Wright et al., 2002, pp. 142–144; Yancey, 2002, p. 56).  
 This first coalition was animated by a common belief in the importance of 
increasing the efficiency of government in order to allow it to meet increasing demands 
on government without having to also increase taxes (Authors’ Interviews FL #1, 2, 3, 6, 





Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles (1991–1998) had pledged to not raise taxes until the 
state ran more efficiently (Klas, 1994). The need for greater government efficiency was a 
longstanding concern of the governor, according to a key gubernatorial staffer:11  
[When Chiles was in the U.S. Senate in the 1980s], he was 
looking at, especially with the Reagan folks there, what 
were then huge budget deficits. No attention to fiscal 
discipline. … You had people like Chiles and some others 
who were interested in reforming the expenditure side. … 
A piece of that was this belief that they were spending a lot 
of money and not getting a lot for it in a variety of areas.  
Chiles was certainly concerned about keeping down taxes but he also thought that if there 
were more accountability, then he could make a pitch for additional revenues because 
greater perceived accountability of the government would create more trust in it and 
greater willingness to spend money on social and education programs (Authors’ 
Interview FL #19).  
 The business supporters of the 1994 Act emphasized the connection between 
greater efficiency and keeping down taxes. Florida TaxWatch, Associated Industries of 
Florida, the Council of 100 (a business advisory group to the governor), and Partners in 
Productivity (a public/private initiative that included Florida TaxWatch, the Council of 
100, and state officials) all advocated the introduction of performance budgeting, 
performance measurement, and incentive-based concepts because they believed 
government—which increased taxes every year in the 1980s—was wasteful (Partners in 
Productivity, 1992, p. 8; also see Berry & Flowers, 1999, pp. 585, 590–591; Bradley & 
Flowers, 2001, p. 374). In 1992, the Partners in Productivity declared:  
Government in Florida is ineffective, inefficient, and 
increasingly expensive, and it suffers from a lack of citizen 
confidence. Over the past decade growth in the size and 
spending of Florida government has outstripped growth in 
the state’s population and economic base. … The State’s 
budget law … should be amended to make performance 
and productivity measures an integral part of the state 
budgeting system. (Partners in Productivity, 1992, pp. 3, 7) 
In 1994, Florida TaxWatch and the Council of 100 strongly pushed for accountability 
                                                 





legislation (Authors’ Interview FL #13; also see Berry & Flowers, 1999, p. 594; Bradley 
& Flowers, 2001, p. 378). 
The second coalition. This coalition agreed with the first coalition on the 
importance of greater government efficiency and accountability, but it differed on a key 
aspect. It favored performance funding, not simply performance budgeting. The coalition 
was largely comprised of senators, many of them Republican, who were more concerned 
with using performance data not just to orient state agency action and inform legislative 
budget decisions but also to allocate funds through algorithms linking performance and 
funding (Authors’ Interviews FL #1, 7, 9, 10, 19, 20; also see Bradley & Flowers, 2001, 
pp. 377, 387; Easterling, 1999, p. 568; Wright et al., 2002, pp. 144–147; Yancey, 2002, p. 
56).  
 The senators were motivated by the belief that market incentives were a very 
effective way of spurring desirable human action (Authors’ Interviews FL #1, 9, 19). For 
example, George Kirkpatrick (D-Gainesville), the Senate’s leading advocate of 
performance funding, was described as believing that “you could get performance altered 
by money. If you put a pot of money out there, people would change their behavior in 
order to chase that money.”12 In the case of higher education, Kirkpatrick and his allies 
believed—according to a staffer who worked closely with him—that colleges should put 
their money at risk and “if you performed well, you got your money back. If you didn’t 
perform well, then you didn’t get your money back and those who had performed better 
got your money.”   
The third coalition. This coalition—centered on community college officials—
joined the second coalition in favoring performance funding. However, the main reason 
these community college officials favored performance funding was not because of a 
fundamental belief that it was important to secure greater government efficiency and that 
performance incentives were a key way of doing so. To be sure, some members of the 
community college coalition did fully share the beliefs of the Republican legislators 
about the importance of government efficiency and market incentives, but this belief did 
not appear to be widely shared among community college officials and faculty (Authors’ 
Interviews FL #7, 10). Rather, their main reason for supporting performance funding was 
                                                 





a desire for additional funding and legitimacy for their institutions (Authors’ Interviews 
FL #1, 7, 8, 10, 19, 20; also see Holcombe, 1997, p. 360). A community college president 
who was very active in this coalition noted:  
We thought it would lead to an improved funding for the 
system. We thought it was a great opportunity to market the 
system in terms of what we do as a community college 
system in terms of outcomes. … We thought it would be a 
great opportunity … to explain to legislators and 
policymakers what the role of the community college was 
all about in the state of Florida.  
Moreover, the community college officials were not supportive—as the senators were—
of having the performance incentive take the form of holding back funding and forcing 
colleges to earn it back through improved performance. Rather, they favored performance 
funding that enabled the community colleges to receive “new” money, that is, funding 
over and above their current appropriation (Authors’ Interview FL #10).   
 In sum, the third coalition of community college officials worked closely with the 
second coalition less because of shared beliefs in particular outcomes of performance 
funding and more because of the shared belief that it was a desirable policy that would 
meet their separate interests. The community colleges were very aware that the 
universities were opposed to performance funding. Thus, by supporting performance 
funding, the community could win legislative favor and, it was hoped, higher 
appropriations. As a state community college official put it:  
Part of our … community college system strategy was to 
become more closely aligned with the legislature and to try 
and read their desires as it fit in with ours. How we could in 
fact do what we wanted to do and at the same time be 
serving our masters in a way that they would want to 
reward us for that.  
Opponents. There was one coalition opposing performance funding, centered on 
the state universities and the Board of Regents that headed them (Authors Interviews FL 
#6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14). University opposition to performance funding was driven in 
great part by the belief that performance funding would result in not more funding but 





So when you ask, “Were the universities looking forward to 
it?”, the answer I think is no, because first of all the 
universities saw it as punitive in nature and as a mechanism 
whereby there would be excuses to take funding away 
rather than having funding added.  
However, this opposition also stemmed from beliefs quite opposite to the basic premises 
of performance funding, at least as it was first being developed in Florida (Authors’ 
Interviews FL #6, 14). As a leading state university official noted,  
I have opposed [performance funding] for the 25 years that 
I have been a [state university official], because I don’t 
think that there are accurate enough measurements. Every 
performance funding scheme I have ever seen, I didn’t feel 
that it was worth a damn. … Let’s talk about value added. I 
always was an advocate, for instance, of Florida A&M 
University, which was the historic black institution in 
Florida. I felt that the value added to a student who entered 
as a freshman and graduated with a bachelor’s degree was a 
hell of a lot more than at the University of Florida. … 
These performance schemes didn’t take that into [account]. 
I mean, they thought you know there was this level playing 
field out there and everybody started from the same spot.  
 In the end, the four-year institutions were never really subject to the Performance-
Based Budgeting performance funding system. They did receive some lump sum 
payments of $3 million per year for three years (fiscal years 1998–2000) to be distributed 
primarily on the basis of institutional graduation rates, but they were never brought into 
the Performance-Based Budgeting program (Authors’ Interviews FL #17, 18, 19; also see 
Wright et al., 2002, pp. 149–152). 
4.3 The Process of Enacting Performance Funding 
 The principal policy entrepreneurs in the development of performance funding in 
Florida were Democratic Governor Lawton Chiles (1991–1998) and Senator George 
Kirkpatrick (D-Gainesville). They were assisted by key gubernatorial aides, leading 
members of the House of Representatives, and state and local community college leaders.  
Gubernatorial and House leadership on the 1994 legislation. Governor Chiles 
was the prime mover of the effort to pass the 1994 Government Performance and 





gubernatorial aides. Leading up to the 1994 legislation, Chiles appointed in 1990 the 
Governor’s Commission for Government by the People—headed by Orlando Mayor Bill 
Frederick—to recommend how to shift the state budget from an emphasis on inputs to 
one on outcomes. Chiles also appointed a Government Accountability to the People 
Commission to develop program and statewide benchmarks and to facilitate input into the 
policy creation process (Berry & Flowers, 1999, pp. 585–587; Bradley & Flowers, 2001, 
p. 374). Members the Chiles administration played key supporting roles in writing the 
1994 legislation, including the budget director, the directors of the departments of 
Management Services and Revenue, and the executive director of the Government 
Accountability to the People Commission (Authors’ Interviews FL #18, 19; also see 
Berry & Flowers, 1999, pp. 586–588, 593).  
 Joining Chiles and his aides in the effort to enact the 1994 Government 
Performance and Accountability Act were several House members, particularly 
Representative Allen Boyd (chair of House Committee on Government Operations) and 
Representative Joe Tedder (Appropriations Committee). Boyd was particularly concerned 
with the need for the state to secure better data for decision making (Authors’ Interview 
FL #19; also see Berry & Flowers, 1999, pp. 587, 593; Bradley & Flowers, 2001, p. 375; 
Easterling, 1999, p. 567).  
Senate leadership on the 1996 and 1997 legislation. When it came to the 1996 
Performance Incentive Funding legislation and the 1997 enactment of the Workforce 
Education Development Fund, policy leadership shifted to the Senate, particularly in the 
person of Senator George Kirkpatrick (D-Gainesville). Kirkpatrick drew together a group 
of legislative staffers and state and local community college officials to design 
performance indicators that would show up in the Performance Incentive Fund (1996) 
and Workforce Development Education Fund (Authors’ Interviews FL #1, 7, 9, 10, 19, 
20; also see Holcombe, 1997, p. 360; Tyree & Hellmich, 1995, p. 18). As a veteran 
legislative staffer noted:  
It was probably ’94, ’95, in that period of time when we 
really sat down and started working with the community 
colleges on making this performance funding kind of thing 
something that will really work. And a fellow that was our 





George Kirkpatrick … kind of got it going with our 
committee and the education subcommittee of our 
appropriations committee. The man who was the executive 
director of the community college system at that time was a 
former senator. … And he worked with Kirkpatrick and we 
got a group of about five community college presidents to 
work with us. And we would meet periodically, once a 
month maybe once every two months. And we would sit 
down and hammer the process out and how we were going 
to do it and how it was going to work.  
 The efforts of this work group headed by Kirkpatrick resulted in the passage of 
the Performance Incentive Funding program in 1996 (1996–1997 General Appropriations 
Act, HB 2715, Specific Appropriation 182A), which created a fund of $12 million for 
community colleges, to be allocated on the basis of the number of degree and certificate 
completers, with extra weight for students who were economically disadvantaged, 
disabled, non-English speakers, passed state job licensure exams, were placed in jobs in 
targeted fields, or graduated with Associate of Arts degrees with fewer than 72 attempted 
credit hours (Wright et al., 2002, pp. 144–145). Kirkpatrick struck a compromise with 
Governor Chiles so that the Performance Incentive Fund established in 1996 was added 
to the existing Performance-Based Budgeting system, with the result that the PB2 system 
included both performance budgeting and performance funding (Wright et al., 2002, p. 
144; Yancey, 2002, p. 56).  
Senator Kirkpatrick and his colleagues were also the key actors behind the 
passage in 1997 of the Workforce Development Education Fund (WDEF) (Laws of 
Florida ch. 97-307, SB1688). The WDEF held back 15% of a community college’s or 
area vocational school’s state appropriation for vocational and technical education and 
required the institution to win this money back based on the institution’s performance on 
number of completions for adult basic education and vocational education and number of 
job placement of students (particularly in higher-paying jobs) (Bell, 2005, pp. 47, 59–60, 
175–176; Florida State Board for Community Colleges, 1998, 2000; Pfeiffer, 1998; 
Wright et al., 2002, p. 163; Yancey, 2002, pp. 59–61). State and local community college 
leaders initially favored this legislation as a way of getting new funds for their vocational 
efforts, which were not being rewarded by the Performance-Based Budgeting system 





provision of reserving 15% of their state workforce appropriations, to be won back by 
good performance (see Dougherty & Natow, 2009). In the end, WDEF was hammered 
out by legislators and staff in the Senate with little input and support from the community 
colleges or from other legislators (Authors’ Interviews; Wright et al., 2002, pp. 147, 152–
153). 
Policy development: The role of policy learning. The performance budgeting 
and funding legislation of 1994 through 1997 drew on a long history of policy 
development in Florida that nicely exemplifies the advocacy coalition framework’s 
emphasis on policy learning (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Over the course of three decades, 
advocates of greater educational accountability gradually moved from incentive programs 
to performances reporting and eventually to performance funding. This was part of a 
general movement in Florida government to increase accountability demands on 
government agencies (Berry & Flowers, 1999; Bradley & Flowers, 2001, p. 371; 
Easterling, 1999; Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 
1997; Wright et al., 2002; Yancey, 2002).  
 In 1977, the legislature mandated (Ch. 77-352, § 4) that every budget request 
include workload and other performance indicators (Easterling, 1999, p. 562). In 1985, 
the Florida Growth Management Act passed, establishing a framework for strategic 
planning. Governor Bob Graham submitted a State Comprehensive Plan that contained 
quantified performance measures and time frames for reaching a series of state goals 
(Berry & Flowers, 1999, p. 584; Bradley & Flowers, 2001, p. 371; Office of Program 
Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, 1997, pp. 6–7; Yancey, 2002, p. 50).  
 Meanwhile, in the 1970s and 1980s, the state introduced incentive programs to 
encourage higher education institutions to develop high quality research programs, attract 
eminent scholars, and collaborate with high technology businesses (Bell, 2005; Wright et 
al., 2002; Yancey, 2002). By the 1980s, Democratic Governor Bob Graham and other 
state officials started calling for public colleges and universities to publicly report their 
performance (Authors’ Interview FL #14). Moreover, the state passed legislation in 1984 
establishing job placement requirements for vocational programs. Programs had to 
demonstrate a training-related placement rate of 70% in order to assure continued funding 





requiring mandatory program review and additional reporting (Yancey, 2002, p. 54).  
By 1991, the state developed a performance reporting system (Florida Statutes, 
1991, § 240.324). The law mandated certain specific indicators, which later became the 
core of the performance funding systems established in 1996 and 1997 (Bell, 2005, p. 39; 
Florida State Board for Community Colleges, 1998, p. 6; Wright et al., 2002, p. 141; 
Yancey, 2002, pp. 54–55).13   
Outside sources played a role in stimulating these internal policy developments. 
Florida policy actors were aware of performance accountability efforts in Texas, 
Minnesota, and North Carolina in the early 1990s. Representative Allen Boyd and 
legislative and gubernatorial staffers attended a national performance measurement 
conference organized by the University of Texas’s Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public 
Affairs in 1992 (Berry & Flowers, 1999, p. 590). In addition, state policy actors consulted 
with national education policy organizations such as the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Education Commission of the States, State Higher Education Executive 
Officers, and the National Center for Higher Education Management Systems (Authors’ 
Interview FL #8). Moreover, Governor Lawton Chiles and other actors were influenced 
by the work of David Osborne on re-inventing government (Authors’ Interview FL #19; 
also see Berry & Flowers, 1999, pp. 586–587). Finally, state policy actors were 
influenced by the National Performance Review that President Clinton and Vice 
President Gore unveiled in March 1993 (Berry & Flowers, 1999, p. 590).  
Agenda setting. Budgetary stringency and change of party control of the  
legislature were two “policy windows” or “external shocks” to the political subsystem 
that provided key openings for the development of performance funding in Florida.  
Budgetary problems. Performance funding was made more attractive by the 
budget woes that the Florida government faced in the early 1990s. Due to the national 
recession, state revenues stagnated from 1990 to 1992, falling well below budget 
projections, at the same time as demand for state services (e.g., welfare, Medicaid, 
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placement rates for vocational students; and student progress by admission status and program (Bell, 2005, 






corrections, public education) escalated sharply (Berry & Flowers, 1999, p. 590; Bradley 
& Flowers, 2001, p. 373; Harper, 1995a; Sanchez-Penley, Martinez, & Nodine, 1997, pp. 
107, 109). As a result, between fiscal year 1990 and fiscal year 1993, total state support 
for higher education (general revenue and lottery revenue) per full time equivalent (FTE) 
student dropped 11% and the community college share of state general revenues dropped 
from 4.7% to 3.7% (Holcombe, 1997, p. 354–356; see also Bergstrom, 1995; Horine, 
1995a, 1995b; Sanchez-Penley et al., 1997, pp. 108, 112, 119). 
 At the same time, there was strong opposition to raising taxes and to establishing 
an income tax (Berry & Flowers, 1999, p. 590; Debenport, Hijek, & Wolfe, 1991). In 
fact, voters passed in 1992 a constitutional amendment limiting growth in the assessment 
of homestead property. And in 1997, a constitutional amendment was passed limiting 
growth in all state revenues to the average growth rate of personal income in Florida over 
the preceding five years (Richardson, Bracco, Callan, & Finney, 1999, p. 92; Sanchez-
Penley et al., 1997, pp. 108–109, 113).  
 Higher education institutions found it difficult to resist these restrictions on 
funding because the colleges were widely seen as inefficient. Many state officials 
believed by the late 1980s that higher education institutions had not improved their 
performance despite special funding (Florida State Board for Community Colleges, 1998; 
Wright et al., 2002, p. 141). Legislators were criticizing the universities for having low 
graduation rates. Senators in particular were very concerned with why students were 
taking five years to graduate from university (Harper, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). And while 
the community colleges were seen more favorably, they were also subject to criticism for 
their high remediation rates (Associated Press, 1996). Moreover, members of the Senate 
Higher Education Committee (particularly George Kirkpatrick) were accusing the 
community colleges of inefficiency in job training, citing high dropout rates and 
duplication of programs between community colleges and area vocational centers (Rado, 
1996).   
 This combination of budget stress and the perceived inefficiency of higher 
education institutions created an opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to suggest 
performance funding. It promised increased funding by seemingly neutralizing criticisms 





Change in party control. The case for performance funding took on added 
interest when control of the state legislature shifted in 1994. Republicans gained a 
majority in the state Senate, and while the state House remained Democratically 
controlled, it became more conservative (Metz & Bartlett, 1994). In 1992, the Senate had 
been equally divided between Republicans and Democrats, and the Senate presidency 
rotated between the two parties. However, Republicans seized control in the 1994 
election (with 22 out of 40 senators). While the House remained Democratic, Democrats 
lost eight seats, so the GOP was only three seats short of control (Richardson et al., 1999, 
p. 91; Sanchez-Penley et al., 1997, p. 114).  
The Republican takeover of the Senate was a significant shift because senators, 
particularly Republicans, were key supporters of performance funding (Authors’ 
Interviews FL #9, 10, 19; also see Sanchez-Penley et al., 1997, pp. 114–115). As a 
leading community college official stated, “I do think that the Republican leadership was 
much more in tune to performance budgeting than what would be the Democrat 
leadership now.”  
4.4 Summary  
 The development of performance funding for higher education in Florida has been 
complicated, involving a number of different enactments that were preceded by a long 
line of policy precursors. The two key systems of performance funding have been 
Performance Based Budgeting (PB2)—which was enacted in 1994 and continues to this 
day—and the Workforce Development Education Fund (WDEF), which was initiated in 
1997 but disappeared after 2002.  
 Three different coalitions of actors—animated by different sets of beliefs and 
interests—were involved in the development of performance funding in Florida. One 
coalition, focused more on performance budgeting than on performance funding, 
involved the governor, key leaders in the House of Representatives, and business 
associations. The other two coalitions that focused on performance funding involved key 
state senators and, separately, key state and local community college officials. Opposing 
these three coalitions was a less mobilized coalition involving the public universities, 





5. South Carolina 
In 1996, South Carolina dramatically restructured its funding for higher 
education. It passed legislation mandating that the Commission on Higher Education 
(CHE) develop a performance funding model that based state appropriations for state 
higher education institutions entirely on performance (Burke, 2002b; South Carolina 
General Assembly, 1996).  
Historically, institutions in South Carolina received state funding based on 
enrollment. However, Act 359 (§ 59-103-15(A)) mandated that the state’s Commission 
on Higher Education distribute all state dollars to the state’s research universities, 
teaching institutions, two-year regional campuses, and technical colleges based on their 
performance on nine “success factors” (Burke, 2002b; South Carolina General Assembly, 
1996). This legislation aroused tremendous interest across the country because it put a 
much greater share of state funding for higher education on a performance basis than any 
state had ever done before (or has ever done since).14  
In the following, we explore the forces that led to the development of South 
Carolina’s performance funding program. We describe key legislative initiatives and 
analyze the actors and motives involved. 
5.1 Structure of the South Carolina Performance Funding System 
 Act 359 in 1996 legislated that 100% of state funding of public higher education 
institutions be based on performance and, in addition, that each public higher education 
institution create mission statements with clear goals, improve faculty quality by 
establishing post-tenure review for professors and expanded training, and foster better 
cooperation among the business community, public education, and higher education. The 
performance funding was to be based on 37 indicators grouped into nine Critical Success 
Factors (in priority order): mission focus, quality of faculty, instructional quality, 
institutional cooperation and collaboration, administrative efficiency, entrance 
requirements, graduates’ achievements, user-friendliness of institution, and research 
funding. Act 359 required each institution to submit performance data to the Commission 
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on Higher Education (CHE). The CHE would then be responsible for deciding how to 
measure performance and drawing up the funding formula. After a “hold harmless” 
period in which state funding would not be based on performance indicators, 100% of 
each school’s state funding would be tied to these measures beginning in fiscal year 
2000.  
5.2 Patterns of Support and Opposition for Performance Funding 
Performance funding was supported by a coalition of legislators and business 
leaders. Opposing them was another coalition centered on the leaders and faculty of the 
state higher education institutions.  
Supporters. The supporters were a coalition of legislators and a segment of the 
business community which was not affiliated with the state’s research universities. The 
governor was supportive but not an active participant (Authors’ Interview SC #10).  
The performance funding legislation was sponsored by a bipartisan coalition of 
legislators, including Senators Nikki Setzler (D-Aiken-Lexington-Saluda Counties), 
McKinley Washington (D-Ravenel), Holly Cork (R-Beaufort) and Representatives 
Ronald Townsend (D-Anderson), David Wright (R-Lexington), and Leon Howard (D-
Columbia) (Burke, 2002b; Fix, 1996b). However, as we will explore below, the key 
figure was Senator Setzler.  
Although many business leaders supported performance funding, they did not 
represent the whole of the business community (Authors’ Interview SC #3). One faculty 
member commented, “I felt that there were a range of business leaders … around Nikki 
Setzler. … I was never convinced that they represented directly any consistent thinking 
on the part of the Chamber of Commerce and others.” The key business activists in favor 
of performance funding—most notably Roger Whaley, a banker, and Austin Gilbert, a 
construction contractor lacking a college degree—were not associated with the major 
research universities. In fact, the trustees of those universities, many of them prominent 
business people, were often opposed to the performance funding legislation.  
Members of the legislative and business coalition supporting performance funding 
shared a common conception that higher education was ineffective and inefficient and 
that greater accountability was required. These policy positions reflected a fundamental 





incentives are a key way of doing so.  
Many members of the advocacy coalition supporting performance funding felt 
that higher education was ineffective, that it was not producing graduates capable of 
meeting the needs of the economy, with the result that South Carolina was losing jobs 
(Authors’ Interviews SC #3, 7, 19; also see Trombley, 1998). One businessman who was 
a key supporter of the performance funding effort commented that higher education 
institutions, especially the technical colleges, were not preparing future workers to meet 
the needs of the business community:  
Technical colleges were getting into the first two years of a 
baccalaureate degree when really we didn’t need more 
baccalaureate degrees. What we needed were more people 
that were interested in what the technical college would 
teach. … And what we were saying is you technical 
schools … needed to focus on technical education and 
leave the first two years of the baccalaureate degree to the 
other institutions which offer the baccalaureate degree.  
Meanwhile, a technical college president recalled that another prominent business 
advocate of performance funding was angry with the research universities for not training 
graduates for his industry: 
[He] had it in for USC [University of South Carolina] 
because he was trying to get USC to develop a four-year 
degree that would serve his industry, and he couldn’t get 
them to do it. … So he had an ax to grind, because they felt 
they couldn’t move their company to the next level because 
it didn’t have the qualified workforce they needed.  
Besides complaining that higher education was ineffective, advocates of 
performance funding also argued that South Carolina’s higher education system was 
inefficient. Critics pointed to the rising cost of higher education, an excessive number of 
institutions in relation to the size of the state, and the close-knit relationships between the 
institutions and legislators leading to unnecessary line items, or pork, as causes of the 
system’s inefficiency (Authors’ Interviews SC #3, 5, 7). A business member who was a 
prime advocate of performance funding commented: 
We were concerned about the spiraling costs of higher 





was steadily increasing. There was a huge increase in 
administration and staff as compared to the number of 
teachers. … I remember they [the universities] talked about 
how they were short of funding, and I went to one 
institution and took picture of gold flush valves on the 
toilets. … It’s a minor thing, but damn it put the money in 
the classrooms. The students needed computers. And the 
professors needed computers, and instead they were putting 
gold flush valves on the toilets.  
Senator Glenn McConnell (R-Charleston) echoed this sentiment: “The idea is to get 
schools to look at the way they utilize their money. … How much money do they spend 
on out-of-state travel? Do they use lavish offices? Do they have lavish entertainment 
accounts?” (as cited in Fix, 1996b). 
Perhaps the most common example cited of higher education’s inefficiency was 
the sheer number of institutions in the state. South Carolina’s public higher education 
system is comprised of 3 research universities, 9 teaching institutions, 5 two-year 
regional campuses, and 16 two-year technical colleges.15 Beginning in the early 1990s, 
there was growing concern among many legislators and state officials that the number of 
public institutions in South Carolina far exceeded demand in a state with stable 
population and enrollments (Authors’ Interviews SC #16, 19; also see Burke, 2002b, 
Frazier & Meggett, 1995). A college administrator noted: “There was a notion that we 
have too many state-supported universities in South Carolina. The question is about 
quality and should the state continue to support that many universities and would it be 
better if funding related to how well you accomplished your mission.”  
Accompanying their belief in the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of higher 
education, the advocates of performance funding believed in a need for greater 
accountability in higher education (Authors’ Interviews SC #16, 17; see also Schmidt, 
1997b). One college administrator said:  
If you asked them [the governor and legislature] what they 
were doing, they wanted accountability. They wanted to 
know how universities were spending their money and they 
                                                 
15 Although they are coordinated by the state Commission on Higher Education (CHE), each public four-
year college and university system is governed by its own board. However, the two-year technical colleges 






wanted to reward the behavior, I mean that’s the only way I 
can put it. In other words, you’re doing your job, you’re 
doing it well and you are going to be rewarded for that.  
Indeed, Senator Setzler was quoted in the press as saying, “To make higher education 
more accountable, we must first define what we expect from the system.  … [The new 
system of financing] will bring us a system of excellence rather than a system that 
supports mediocrity” (as cited in Schmidt, 1997b). 
Underlying the supportive coalition’s policy core beliefs concerning higher 
education was a more fundamental belief about the importance of government efficiency 
and how it was best served. During the early 1990s there was a push to make state 
government become more efficient by becoming more market-oriented (Authors’ 
Interviews SC #6, 18).  
A state university official noted how the state embraced the Baldridge Program in 
“an attempt to make government run like a business. … ‘Let’s embrace Baldridge. Let’s 
do the whole Total Quality Movement concept and apply it to government.’” A 
consultant familiar with South Carolina echoed this assessment: 
I think that the people who thought it up, certainly [Sen.] 
Nikki [Setzler], and the business community, and the 
business community was very, very heavily pushing for 
this. This was also very close to the days of TQM [Total 
Quality Management] and performance management, CQI 
[Continuous Quality Improvement], and they thought that 
this was really a step in the direction of modern 
management and would result in better data systems and 
more accountable management. So a lot of it was the 
business community pushing on that.  
Governor Beasley: Interested but not active. Although Governor David 
Beasley signed the performance funding legislation and supported the program, he was 
not an active member of the coalition (Authors’ Interview SC #2). A high-level state 
official noted: “[Governor Beasley] wasn’t a leader in it. He didn’t dream that up. He just 
signed the legislation. ... He wasn’t the moving spirit behind it. He just signed it. The 
business community was the moving spirit behind it.”  
Opponents. The primary coalition opposing performance funding involved the 





institutions publicly supported performance funding, they opposed it privately. Many 
respondents suggested that, due to political pressure and the national attitude favoring 
accountability, state higher education institutions felt that publicly supporting 
performance funding was the only viable option, despite their undisclosed opposition.16  
The coalition opposing performance funding was comprised of the leaders of the 
state higher education institutions, particularly the research universities, the Commission 
on Higher Education (CHE), and the State Board for Technical and Comprehensive 
Education (SBTCE) (Authors’ Interviews SC #1, 14, 22). Although the Commission on 
Higher Education remained publicly neutral on Act 359, it was privately opposed 
(Authors’ Interview SC #1). Similarly, a former staff member of the SBTCE reflected, 
“Well, not only our board, but all of the higher education community found the initial 
proposal, as in any public administration systemic move like this, they found it rather 
threatening.”  
 The opposition coalition was united in their belief that the performance funding 
system did not address the chronic underfunding of the higher education system, had too 
many indicators, would lead to cost-cutting measures that would negatively affect 
academic quality, and might even lead to institutional closure (Fix, 1996c; Schmidt, 
1997a). Prior to the enactment of performance funding, many higher education officials 
had argued that the legislature was not adequately funding the state’s higher education 
institutions (Authors’ Interview SC #3). Professor Jack Parsons, Chair of the South 
Carolina Faculty Chairs (an association of elected faculty leaders from the state’s 18 
public four-year colleges), stated: “My fear is that the move to performance-based 
funding will serve to mask the poor performance of the state legislature in funding higher 
education” (as cited in Schmidt, 1997a). One faculty member recalls, “We consistently 
were pointing out that in terms of tuition we were second high[est] only to Virginia, but 
in terms of state funding and formula funding we were at the bottom or very nearly at the 
bottom, and that the idea that we could do more with less didn't make much sense if you 
                                                 
16 In the press, the majority of higher education officials praised the initiative. For example, Ron Ingle, 
president of Coastal Carolina University and chairman of the South Carolina Council of College and 
University Presidents, publicly supported performance funding: “We need to focus more clearly on what 
our mission is and how it compares within the state system. This is a very positive thing, and I think all my 
colleagues applaud this effort to evaluate the system” (as cited in Meggett, 1996). However, Burke (2002b) 
concluded that, although the Council of Presidents publicly supported performance funding, privately they 





compared us to other institutions in the region.” 
A number of institutional leaders believed that performance funding could lead to 
institutional closures (Authors’ Interviews SC #16, 19). In fact, several newspaper 
articles reporting on the performance funding legislation suggested that the policy would 
allow the closing of institutions based on politically acceptable criteria (Associated Press, 
2003; Fix, 1996b; Heilprin, 1996). Moreover, a report issued by South Carolina 
Legislative Audit Council (LAC) stated, “Officials stated that the original intent of 
performance funding was to take funding from weak institutions and lead to their 
closure” (South Carolina Legislative Audit Council, 2001). 
5.3 The Process of Enacting Performance Funding 
 Performance funding in South Carolina could not have occurred without the 
leadership of Democratic Senator Nikki Setzler, chair of the Senate education committee 
and chair of the Senate appropriations subcommittee for education funding. As a result of 
his tenure in the state Senate, connections with the business community, and past political 
victories, Senator Setzler was a key leader of performance funding policy from its 
inception (Authors’ Interviews SC #1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 15, 19, 20, 24; also see Burke, 2002b). A 
higher education insider described Senator Setzler’s role: “I really viewed Senator Setzler 
as being more the catalyst for the performance part of it than any of the commissioners 
[of the Commission on Higher Education]. … It was largely something that Senator 
Setzler believed in and wanted to get accomplished.” Senator Setzler was the public face 
of the initiative. He was constantly quoted in the press and was considered the architect 
of the policy.  
Due to his previous work on education legislation, many considered Senator 
Setzler to be a natural leader for higher education reform (Authors’ Interviews SC #15, 
19). As a legislative staff member noted,  
One of his [Senator Setzler’s] first hallmark pieces of 
legislation shortly after he was first elected, I think in the 
late 1970s was working with some senior Senators on the 
K-12 Education Finance Act that is still in use today as a 
general distribution formula for states monies to go back to 
local school districts. So this was not out of character for 





In addition, Setzler had close ties to key business people. A college president noted that 
Setzler “was very much a pusher of getting the business viewpoint into higher education. 
So that it would be run more like a business.”  
A former CHE staff member suggested that Senator Setzler had several motives 
for pushing performance funding in South Carolina. 
Senator Setzler saw a chance to say from a political 
perspective, “I can score some brownie points and try to get 
the institutions to behave. I can make them more 
accountable. I can sort of improve my political fortune and 
my legacy as an education legislator by doing something to 
improve higher education in the state.” Now the institutions 
wanted more money and he said, “Well, okay here’s what 
we can do. I will do everything I can to get you more 
money, but you’ve got to put something on the table. And 
what you’re going to have to put on the table is 
performance funding.”  
Policy selection. Although there is a general consensus regarding Senator 
Setzler’s role in the policy process, there are varying views on where the idea for 
performance funding came from. Our research suggests that the idea to institute 
performance funding may have come from four different sources: policy learning based 
on the South Carolina experience, the business community, national organizations, and 
other states.  
Policy learning.  South Carolina had a history of higher education accountability 
legislation in the 1980s and early 1990s before it took up performance funding in 1996. A 
consultant familiar with South Carolina emphasized the importance of the state’s history 
with performance reporting:  
It goes back to the first days, essentially of state-mandated 
assessment which was in the late ’80s and South Carolina 
was one of the early adopters. So they had something called 
Cutting Edge legislation back in 1988. … And that first 
proposed performance indicators. … It was succeeded by 
Act 255 in 1992, which put a little bit harder edge on the 
performance measures and defined them a little bit better. 
… So by the time performance funding came out in 199[6] 
with Act 359, the state was pretty sophisticated with regard 
to the kinds of people that they had that knew what they 





In 1988, the General Assembly passed Act 629, referred to as “A Cutting Edge.” 
According to a former Commission on Higher Education staffer, Act 629 “gave the 
Commission authority … to require certain reporting elements, which were to be reported 
to the state agency to the Commission and to the public” (Authors’ Interview SC #2; also 
see Festa, 2004). In the years following, all South Carolina public institutions “adopted 
assessment programs and an assessment network was formed to share and review 
information being gathered” (Festa, 2004).  
In 1992, Act 255 was passed, which required public higher education institutions 
to report annually to the General Assembly through the South Carolina Commission on 
Higher Education (Festa, 2004). The items to be included in the report included 
institutional performance related to specialized program accreditation, student degree 
completion, the type of faculty teaching lower-division courses, enrollment and success 
of students in remedial courses, student participation in sponsored research, graduate 
placement data, minority enrollment, the state from which graduate students received 
undergraduate degrees, information on student transfers, student performance on 
professional examinations, information from alumni satisfaction surveys, and information 
from institutional assessment activities (Festa, 2004). 
Business ideas. As we have noted, business people were a key part of the 
coalition favoring performance funding, and they had long been arguing the value of 
importing business practices into higher education (Authors’ Interviews SC #6, 18, 19). 
A technical college president commented:  
There were several businessmen on the Commission on 
Higher Education … and I think they borrowed the notion 
from some kind of corporate idea that they had about 
performance funding. And of course what they really 
wanted was the funding to be 100% driven by performance. 
National organizations. Other respondents suggested that the idea of performance 
funding may have come through the influence of national organization such as the 
National Governors’ Association (NGA) or the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) (Authors’ Interview SC #6). At events sponsored by these organizations, 
representatives from various states come together and have the opportunity to share ideas 





performance funding to the NCSL. “I think that [Senator] Nikki [Setzler] was at an 
NCSL meeting somewhere and he picked it up. I mean this was the period when we were 
coining the phrase ‘legislation by fax’; you know, where people would send all these 
kinds of things back and forth.”  
Other states. South Carolina’s geographic proximity to Tennessee, the first state 
in the United States to enact performance funding, may have also contributed to the idea 
gaining traction (Authors’ Interviews SC #6, 9). In addition, the Southern Regional 
Education Board in March 1996 had held a conference on performance budgeting 
(Schmidt, 1996). As a university president remarked: “I believe this came about largely 
as a result of Senator Setzler looking at some comparative practices in other states, some 
of the readings he did, and essentially decided that he’d like to see this, at least some 
variation of this, underway in South Carolina.”  
5.4 Agenda Setting 
 The efforts of the advocates of performance funding were aided by two key 
political developments in the mid-1990s: the 1994 election of a Republican governor and 
the Republican takeover of the state House of Representatives and the consequent 
passage in 1995 of legislation (Act 137) restructuring the Commission of Higher 
Education (CHE). This restructuring of the CHE removed it as an effective impediment 
to the passage of performance funding. Moreover, a corollary of the restructuring was the 
creation of a Joint Legislative Committee that provided the arena within which Senator 
Setzler drew up and mobilized support for Act 359 establishing performance funding.  
 Act 137 (1995) restructured the Commission of Higher Education and created a 
Joint Legislative Committee to study higher education. Act 137 diminished the role of the 
Commission by changing the title of the CHE chief executive from commissioner to 
executive director, declared the new position as not subject to the state’s civil service act 
(allowing dismissal without cause), and severely restricted the appointive power of the 
executive director. Additionally, it delayed the convening of the reconstituted CHE until 
July 1996, turning the existing Commission and its commissioner, Fred Sheheen, into 
lame ducks for over a year (Burke, 2002b). These changes rendered the Commission 
unable to effectively oppose the performance funding proposal. 





Democrats lost control of the state House of Representatives, Speaker Robert Sheheen 
(D-Kershaw), who had served as Speaker of the House since 1986, lost his leadership 
position and therefore his capacity to protect his brother, Fred Sheheen, the 
Commissioner of Higher Education (Burke, 2002b). In addition, the cutting down of the 
Commission on Higher Education owed its origins to the growing dissatisfaction on the 
part of many college presidents and business members serving on boards of trustees of 
the major research institutions regarding the growing political power of the CHE 
(Authors’ Interview SC #15; also see Burke, 2002b; Fix, 1996a). Traditionally, South 
Carolina had had one of the most decentralized systems of higher education governance 
in the United States. This decentralized system created an environment where university 
presidents dominated policymaking, at both their institutions and in the state capital. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the CHE gained political power under the 
leadership of Commissioner Fred R. Sheheen. With strong political connections, Sheheen 
had become a significant political force in the state’s politics of higher education, much 
to the distress of the state universities (Burke, 2002b; Fix 1996a, 1996b).  
Besides reducing greatly the power of the Commission of Higher Education, Act 
137 also established a Joint Legislative Committee (JLC) to conduct a comprehensive 
review of public higher education. The JLC thus became the staging ground for the 
development of a plan for performance funding. The Committee was comprised of four 
senators, four members of the House of Representatives, and four business leaders. The 
committee selected Senator Setzler to be chair. Members of the higher education 
community were not allowed to formally participate; they could attend meetings of the 
JLC but could not speak unless called on (Authors’ Interviews SC #3, 14, 21; see also 
Trombley, 1998). The change in venue to the Joint Legislative Committee helped to 
establish performance funding in South Carolina. The state higher education institutions 
were shut out of the political process and therefore had to reconcile their private dislike 
of the legislation with the political reality of the situation. A consultant who worked with 
the state noted:  
People, at least at the state level, felt positively about this 
[performance funding]. That was not the case when you got 
out to the institutions, though I would say there wasn’t any 





were concerns of political backlash against them if they 
were too vocally opposed to it, especially when they hadn’t 
even implemented it yet.  
On February 7, 1996, the Joint Legislative Committee published its final report 
outlining a process “to reward successful higher education programs and penalize those 
programs that fail to achieve certain goals” (Gaulden, 1996). The committee proposed 
performance funding based on nine “success factors” comprised of 36 indicators. It also 
advocated a hold-harmless provision, preventing any institution from losing funding due 
to the proposed formula until its full implementation in the 2000 fiscal year (Burke, 
2002b).  
 The Joint Legislative Committee had not explicitly recommended that 100% of 
state appropriations to public institutions should be put on a performance basis. However, 
those knowledgeable about the period felt that the concept of 100% performance funding 
was assumed by all members of the Committee. In any case, all members of the 
committee approved the text of Act 359 before it was presented to the General Assembly 
(Authors’ Interview SC #21). 
5.5 Summary 
The origins of South Carolina’s performance funding initiative involved an astute 
policy entrepreneur, Senator Nikki Setzler, who was able to assemble an effective 
coalition of legislators and business people to support performance funding. Moreover, 
he was adept at seizing the political opening created by the 1994 Republican takeover of 
the state House of Representatives to open up a new policy venue—the Joint Legislative 
Committee to investigate higher education—in which a performance funding plan could 
be developed, opposition from the state colleges and universities stifled, and new 
supporters for performance funding recruited. As a result, South Carolina became the first 
state in the nation to legislate that 100% of state appropriations for public higher 






In 1998, the Illinois Community College Board (ICCB) approved the formation of 
a performance funding system—the Performance-Based Incentive System (PBIS)—and 
the General Assembly voted $1 million to begin the program in fiscal year 1999 (Illinois 
Community College Board, 1998b). In this section, we describe the PBIS system and 
analyze its origins.  
6.1 Structure of the Illinois Performance-Based Incentive System  
 Although the advisory committee that designed the structure of the PBIS had 
recommended that at least 2% of the state’s appropriation to community colleges be 
based on performance, the amount of funding involved was much smaller. Funding 
allocations for PBIS were $1 million in fiscal year 1999, $1.5 million in fiscal year 2000, 
and $1.9 million in fiscal year 2001 (Illinois Community College Board, 1998b, 2000, p. 
3). These funds amounted to only 0.4% of state appropriations to the community colleges 
in fiscal year 2001 (Illinois Community College Board, 2002, Tables IV-5 and IV-14).17 
 PBIS consisted of six statewide goals, accounting for 60% of the PBIS money, 
and one district goal, which accounted for 40%. The six statewide goals were the 
following (Illinois Community College Board, 1998b, 2000, 2003): 
• Student satisfaction (12% of total weight): percentage of 
students who are somewhat or very satisfied with courses in 
their major, courses outside their major, and student support 
programs (the only students surveyed were occupational 
completers). 
• Student educational advancement (12%): among first-time 
college students who earned at least 12 credits within first four 
years of enrolling, the number who earned a degree or 
certificate, transferred to a two-year or four-year institution, or 
who were still enrolled in their college of origin after five 
years. 
                                                 
17 In fiscal year 2001, state funds for performance funding amounted to $1.9 million, total state funding for 
community colleges amounted to $468 million, and total community college current fund revenues from all 





• Student success in employment/continued pursuit of education 
(12%): the number of graduates who were employed or 
currently enrolled in college. 
• Student transfers (8%): the number who transferred to a four-
year institution within five years of college entrance, among 
students who completed a minimum of 12 college-level credits 
in a BA/transfer program at a single community college within 
four years of entering that college.  
• Population served (8%): average credit enrollments over three 
years divided by a district’s population.  
• Academically disadvantaged students’ success (8%): 
percentage of remedial courses completed of total remedial 
courses attempted for the fiscal year.  
For the one local goal (worth 40%), each community college district selected one 
area of focus from the following three (Illinois Community College Board, 2000, p. 3):  
• Workforce preparation: chosen by 8 community college 
districts.  
• Technology: chosen by 21 districts.  
• Responsiveness to local need: chosen by 10 districts.  
Three panels (one for each goal) appointed by the Presidents Council determined 
how well the local goals were met (Illinois Community College Board, 1998b). During 
the first year (fiscal year 1999), the panels reviewed the community colleges’ proposed 
goals, plans, and benchmarks and decided which ones would be funded. During fiscal 
years 2000–2002, the colleges funded were reviewed for evidence of how well they 
implemented their plans and addressed the comments of the review panels (Illinois 
Community College Board, 2000, pp. 3–4).  
6.2 Patterns of Support and Opposition for Performance Funding  
The supporters of performance funding for community colleges comprised a 
coalition of state and local community college officials. There was no opposing group. 





them, but this was not proposed. Meanwhile, the business community was uninvolved.  
Supporters. The effort to establish the Performance-Based Incentive System was 
led by a coalition centered on officials of the Illinois Community College Board and the 
Illinois Council of Community College Presidents. The Presidents Council had suggested 
performance funding as a means of increasing state aid for community colleges (Illinois 
Council of Community College Presidents, 1995). This suggestion was accepted by the 
Illinois Community College Board in 1998 (details below), which then made a successful 
budget request to fund performance funding beginning in fiscal year 1999 (Illinois 
Community College Board, 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Authors’ Interview Data).  
 The governor, legislature, and Board of Higher Education supported performance 
funding to the degree that they supported the ICCB request for funding. However, they 
did not initiate or demand performance funding.   
 The coalition of state and local community college officials who favored 
performance funding was united by the beliefs that community colleges needed new 
sources of revenue that were not enrollment-based, that performance funding would be a 
viable source of that revenue, that performance funding provided a means to improve the 
quality of community college teaching and learning, and that a performance funding 
system should be designed by the community college system and not by external forces 
(Authors’ Interviews IL #3, 4, 9, 11, 24, 26).  
The primary belief of the supporters of performance funding was the importance 
of securing additional funding for community colleges that was not based primarily on 
enrollments (Illinois Community College Board, 1996, pp. 3, 8, 17; idem, 1998a, p. 3; 
Authors’ Interviews IL #4, 11, 12, 26). As a leading state-level advocate of community 
colleges noted,  
Toward the end of the ’90s we were running out of ideas 
about how to get additional dollars. We knew there were 
dollars out there; the question was how do we justify it. At 
that point, the state was coming close to fully funding the 
enrollment-based funding formula for the community 
colleges. The universities in Illinois are incrementally 
funded. That is to say, it doesn’t make any difference 






Many of the supporters of non-enrollment-based funding for community college 
believed performance funding would provide a useful way of doing this, because it 
resonated with legislative and gubernatorial concerns about making higher education 
more efficient (Authors’ Interviews IL #4, 11, 24, 26; also see Illinois Community 
College Board, 1998a, pp. 3, 16). As a state-level higher education advocate noted,  
We basically needed, if we were going to get more of the 
money on the table, which would otherwise go to other 
sectors such as universities or K-12 or mental health or any 
of our competitors, we had to figure out other nifty new 
claims on the state dollar and this performance-based 
funding program that you are talking about was one of the 
ideas put on the table and adopted.  
 Secondly, many of the advocates of performance funding saw it as a means to 
improve the quality of community college teaching and learning. The Advisory 
Committee on a Performance Based Incentive System stated:  
The primary goal of any community college is to provide 
the highest quality educational services possible. A 
practical, effective way of assuring continuing 
improvement of Illinois community colleges is to tie 
demonstrated quality to some funds received. A 
performance based incentive system for Illinois community 
colleges should focus on teaching and learning. The system 
should reward institutions for high performance and/or 
significant improvement, establish state and district goals 
and priorities, provide consequential information for 
institutions to use in improving performance, provide 
accountability information to state policy makers, and build 
credibility and support for community colleges. (Illinois 
Community College Board, 1998a, p. 4) 
 Finally, the community college advocates of performance funding believed that 
any performance funding system for community colleges should be designed by the 
community college system itself. They were leery of having a performance funding 
system designed by others and imposed on the community college system (Authors’ 
Interviews IL #3, 4, 7, 9, 27). In the words of a state community college official: 
The Illinois Community College Board … really attempted 
to get out in front of the discussion. … [R]ather than being 





front of it. … We could jointly go to the Illinois legislature, 
we could jointly go to … [Governor] Jim Edgar, and we 
could talk about this particular initiative that community 
colleges were advocating. So what happened was, granted 
the seed was sown by the governor and to some degree by 
the GA [General Assembly], but [we] … claimed 
ownership on that, and presented it to them. So rather than 
them force-feeding us, it almost became an initiative we 
were suggesting to them. 
Opponents. There was no organized opposition to performance funding for 
community colleges. There is evidence that some local community college officials had 
reservations about performance funding (Authors’ Interviews IL #3, 17; Illinois 
Community College Board, 1998a, pp. 16, 25). When hearings were held by the ICCB 
Advisory Committee on a Performance Based Incentive System, some local community 
college officials expressed a fear that the performance funding would constitute not new 
money over and above the regular enrollment-based funding colleges received but rather 
existing funding that was now tied to performance measures. Concerns were also raised 
that the performance funding proposal would discriminate against small colleges that 
lacked resources (Illinois Community College Board, 1998a, pp. 16, 25).  However, these 
reservations did not eventuate in any major opposition or concerted action against the 
idea of performance funding, which in fact had the endorsement of the Illinois Council of 
Community College Presidents (1995).  
Uninvolved but potentially opposed. An uninvolved, but potentially opposed 
group were the public universities, particularly the University of Illinois. The public 
universities did not oppose the proposal for performance funding for community colleges, 
since it did not apply to the four-year colleges and universities. However, it is clear that if 
an effort had been made to expand performance funding to the universities, they would 
have strongly opposed it (Authors’ Interviews IL #3a, 19, 20, 24, 27). University 
officials—particularly those associated with the University of Illinois18—strongly 
questioned the applicability of the business model of organization to higher education. A 
                                                 
18 It appears that Southern Illinois University was somewhat intrigued by the idea of performance funding 
and was watching what the community colleges were doing. However, this interest never took the form of 
advocacy, and it was coupled with awareness that SIU faculty were quite nervous about performance 





leading university official stated forcefully: 
I don’t think business models work in higher education. … 
How do you set up any kind of outcomes when you are 
trying to evaluate engineering versus the fine arts versus 
business school? … How do you do that so that’s within 
the University of Illinois? If you look across the state of 
Illinois, then you’ve got two Research One institutions, two 
Research Two institutions, and then you have a number of 
teaching institutions, again with different missions and 
having a different mix of students and having much 
different missions. So how do you set up any kind of 
outcome measures … that you tie your budget to that are 
equitable under those kinds of diverse conditions? I just 
don’t see how you can do it.  
Uninvolved. The business community might seem to be a natural proponent of 
performance funding. However, business in Illinois did not evidence much interest in 
performance funding, according to a wide variety of observers (Authors’ Interviews IL 
#13, 14, 15, 20, 24). A top state public official noted:  
I don’t remember the business community getting real 
involved in this. … I never remember a lot of complaints 
about higher education coming from the business 
community. … There are organizations like the Business 
Roundtable in the state or we have something in Illinois 
called the Civic Committee, which is [comprised of] the 
major CEOs in Chicago. I just don’t remember them 
spending a lot of time talking about higher education.  
6.3 The Process of Enacting Performance Funding 
The idea of performance funding arose as the Illinois community colleges sought 
new ways to increase their state funding after encountering limits to using enrollments as 
a basis of funding increases (Illinois Council of Community College Presidents, 1995; 
Authors’ Interviews IL #4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 26). In 1995, the Presidents Council 
proposed several ways of changing the funding formula for Illinois community colleges. 
One proposal was to include “performance-based funding” with an eye to “encourage and 
recognize quality, efficiency, and productivity level and to raise the level of 
accountability.” The Presidents Council had gotten this idea from the experience of 





Community College Presidents, 1995, pp. 17, 25).  
 The Presidents Council report was taken up by the Illinois Community College 
Board, which established a task force on system funding in 1996. The Task Force 
included representatives from the Presidents Council and organizations representing 
community college trustees, chief financial officers, college administrators, faculty, and 
students, as well as staff from the Illinois Community College Board and the Illinois 
Board of Higher Education (Illinois Community College Board, 1996, p. iii).  The Task 
Force recommended implementation in fiscal year 1999 of a performance funding system 
(Illinois Community College Board, 1996, p. 17). It is clear that one of the reasons 
performance funding was chosen was that it was likely to appeal to state policymakers 
interested in greater accountability for higher education (Authors’ Interviews IL #4, 11, 
24, 26).  
This recommendation of performance funding was then energetically pursued by 
Joseph Cipfl when he became Chief Executive Officer of the Illinois Community College 
Board in 1997 (Authors’ Interviews IL #4, 7, 9, 10, 25, 26). A key vehicle to bring 
together various constituencies was the Advisory Committee on a Performance Based 
Incentive System, which was established in 1997 with funds appropriated by the 
legislature. The committee was composed of local community college officials 
(presidents and other administrators, faculty members, and students) and several staff 
members of the Illinois Community College Board (including two vice presidents). It was 
advised by a prominent out-of-state higher education consultant (Illinois Community 
College Board, 1998a).  
In 1997, the Committee held three hearings across the state and received feedback 
from community college presidents on its draft report. Its final report in May 1998 
detailed what form a performance based funding system should take, including what 
performance indicators should be used, how they should be measured, and what weights 
should be attached to each (Illinois Community College Board, 1998a). The Illinois 
Community College Board formally accepted the Advisory Committee’s final report in 
May 1998 (Illinois Community College Board, 1998b). However, the ICCB had already 
requested funds—on the basis of an interim report in fall 1997—to begin performance 





for $5.4 million. Its request was cut to $1 million by the Board of Higher Education, and 
this was the amount eventually appropriated by the General Assembly (Illinois 
Community College Board, 1998b, p. 45).  
Agenda setting. Two external political developments shaped how community 
college officials pursued performance funding. One was an increasing concern about 
higher education accountability and efficiency on the part of state elected officials. The 
second was the enactment of performance funding in South Carolina in 1996. 
Through the 1990s, there was an increasing belief among state elected officials 
that higher education was not sufficiently efficient or accountable (Authors’ Interviews 
IL #3, 4, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 26).19 A leading state elected official noted:  
There is this perception, I think, among the public and 
government that higher education is pretty fat and sassy 
and in some ways is not a necessity. … I think our thinking 
was, yeah, higher education really hasn’t changed and you 
know there are places there they can squeeze a little bit and 
reorganize and become a little bit more up-to-date, like the 
rest of government has had to do.  
This concern about higher education accountability intensified after the 1994 election. 
The Republicans gained control of both branches of government, adding the House of 
Representatives to their existing control of the governor’s office and the Senate. This 
greatly increased Republican strength and, in turn, general sentiment in favor of higher 
education accountability (Authors’ Interview IL #14). 
A state community college official noted how community college advocates of 
performance funding made sure to couple their policy proposal to the accountability 
concerns of state elected officials:  
In the late ’90s there was a feeling that higher education 
was not necessarily as accountable as it should be in the 
                                                 
19 We found little evidence that the concern of state elected officials about higher education efficiency and 
accountability was due to public pressure. In a search of Illinois newspapers in Lexis-Nexis for 1994–1998, 
we did come across a few articles discussing the fact that tuition was rapidly rising (Dodge, 1997; Drell and 
Golab, 1998; Pokorski, 1996). Indeed, the average in-state public tuition in 1994–1995 at Illinois four-year 
colleges was high: it stood at $3,352, 118% of the national average of $2,848 (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 1996, p. 322). However, none of the articles that we found discussed any public 
protest, particularly in any organized form, or calls for greater higher education accountability. Moreover, 






state of Illinois. … And so it [the request for performance 
funding] was to a certain degree political in the standpoint 
of, well, if we can garner some more funding for the 
system, if we have to call it performance based because 
that’s what is selling, then let’s do it. … I think they 
[community college presidents] looked at it ultimately from 
the standpoint of, well if it’s an effort to get additional 
money into the system, if that’s what we have to do, that’s 
what we have to call it, so be it. Because money is money 
no matter what you call it.  
 A second policy window that aided the advocates of performance funding to 
secure support within the community college community was the enactment by South 
Carolina in 1996 of a performance funding system that tied 100% of state appropriations 
to public higher education to performance (Burke, 2002b). This caught the notice of 
Illinois community college officials who were concerned that Illinois elected officials 
might be tempted by this precedent (Authors’ Interviews IL #3, 4, 7, 9). As a leading 
state community college official noted: 
South Carolina stands out because it was enacted there by 
their legislature, and they had, I don’t remember 26, or 56 
[laughter] or so … indicators, and you know, many of 
them, particularly at that time, were just impossible. Many 
of them were determined, as I recall, by the legislature 
itself, rather than by the educational system. And so, I think 
that was one of the driving forces: that we felt that if we 
stepped forward with it, then we were able to determine 
what those measures were going to be, and that they were 
ones that we felt comfortable with having the data, or being 
able to eventually have the data to be able to support it.  
6.4 Summary  
 The origins of the Performance-Based Incentive System for Illinois community 
colleges lie primarily with state and local leaders of the community colleges. They 
championed performance funding primarily as a politically attractive device to secure 
additional funds for community colleges and to head off the possibility of a form of 
performance funding that would be unpalatable to community colleges.  
 The driving forces behind performance funding were the Illinois Community 





legislators, and the Board of Higher Education were supportive of the Illinois Community 
College Board’s proposal for performance funding, but they did not initiate or call for 
performance funding themselves, although they supported the idea of greater 
accountability for higher education. Business was uninvolved.  
 There was no opposition. However, the state universities would have been 
opposed if an effort had been made to apply performance funding to them as well.   
 
7. Washington  
 
 Washington State established performance funding at two different points in time. 
The first performance funding program, which affected all higher education institutions, 
was adopted by the state legislature via budgetary proviso in 1997 and was discontinued 
in 1999 (Dougherty & Natow, 2009). The second program, adopted in 2007, applies only 
to the state’s community colleges. To explain the rise of these two different performance 
funding policies, this section looks at the various actors and contextual circumstances that 
led to their establishment.  
7.1 The 1997–1999 Performance Funding Program 
 Washington enacted a performance funding system of accountability for public 
institutions of higher education in 1997, as a proviso in its appropriations bill for the 
1997–1999 biennium. During the first year that the proviso was in effect (1997 to 1998), 
institutions were required only to develop “implementation plan[s]” for achieving 
improvement on specified performance indicators. However, in the following year, a 
small percentage of institutions’ state appropriations was held back, and colleges and 
universities were required to meet or exceed certain levels on those performance 
indicators in order to receive full appropriations (Washington State Legislature, 1997; see 
also Nisson, 2003; Washington State Higher Education Coordinating Board, 1998).  
The performance measures that were adopted for four-year institutions differed 
from those for two-year institutions. For public four-year colleges, the performance 





degree efficiency,20 and “[a]n additional measure and goal to be selected by the higher 
education coordinating board … in consultation with each institution” (Washington State 
Legislature, 1997; see also Sanchez, 1998; Washington State Higher Education 
Coordinating Board, 1998, p. 2). The performance of public two-year colleges was 
measured based on transfer rates, “[c]ore course completion rates,” the hourly earnings of 
institutions’ occupational program alumni, and time-to-degree efficiency (Washington 
State Legislature, 1997; see also Nisson, 2003).  
7.2 Patterns of Support and Opposition for the 1997 Performance Funding Proviso 
Supporters 
Washington’s first performance funding program was supported by a coalition of 
legislators (particularly Republicans) and the business community (Authors’ Interviews; 
see also Nisson, 2003). Additionally, the Democratic governor was a supporter of 
accountability for higher education and ultimately signed the budget bill that brought 
performance funding into being. 
One business actor recalled that “there was a lot of support in the legislature” for 
performance funding, particularly from the then-House Appropriations Chairman, a 
Republican (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23; see also 
Nisson, 2003). Lawmakers’ support of the performance funding proviso was largely 
motivated by a belief that private-sector market principles may be effectively applied to 
public-sector institutions. One state-level higher education official noted that the 
legislators who were the main proponents of performance funding were Republicans who 
believed in “smaller government, and fiscal restraint.” The same official noted that they 
also believed “in the notion that we tend to get more of what the funding structure 
responds to, so what is incentivized and measured and funded, we tend to get more of and 
less of other things.”  
Another state government insider described the legislature’s general belief that 
colleges and universities were inefficient and often unproductive: 
At the time, I think the legislature was perceiving higher ed 
                                                 
20 This was labeled the “graduation efficiency index” in the legislation (1997 Wa. ALS 454, § 601, 1997 
Wa. Ch. 454; 1997 Wa. HB 2259; see also Washington State Higher Education Coordinating Board, 1998, 





as somewhat wasteful, and not being demanding enough of 
students. The publicly-funded, supported students were 
marking time in higher ed and graduating with degrees that 
didn’t match the needs of the economy.  
 Also evident is the fact that legislators believed performance funding 
accountability would serve the interests of the business community (Authors’ Interview 
WA #12). A state government insider said the legislative proponents of the 1997–1999 
proviso were motivated by the desire “to get a better value for the taxpayer dollar that 
was subsidizing activities on higher ed campuses. And they wanted higher ed to pay 
attention more to the needs of the business community and the economy.”  
The state’s governor was also supportive of higher education performance 
accountability (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 12, 20; Paulson, 1997). A state community 
and technical college board staffer explained,  
[I]t started with the governor, and the governor wanted 
performance measures put into the budget … He wanted to 
figure out how to measure outcomes or results for higher 
education. So he put some language in the budget that 
called for measures to be developed … When it got to the 
legislature, they—the Chair of the House Appropriations 
Committee—decided to ratchet it up a level by putting 
specific measures in and by attaching funding to it.  
The Washington business community also supported performance funding for 
higher education (Authors’ Interviews WA #5, 10, 14, 16, 20). One leading business 
organization created a task force to study performance funding initiatives in other states 
and developed a policy statement supporting performance funding that was submitted to 
the legislature (Authors’ Interview WA #10). Moreover, a former legislator recalled: 
“They [business representatives] came to the higher education committees and spoke in 
support of performance criteria at our public hearings on bills, both in the budget as well 
as higher education accountability legislation.” Despite this evidence of the business 
sector’s strong support for performance funding accountability, our interviews revealed 
no clear evidence that it was the state’s business community that originally developed the 






Involved but not clearly supportive: The higher education boards. The Higher 
Education Coordinating Board could have been a supporter of performance funding. It 
was interested in holding state colleges and universities accountable for their outcomes 
(Authors’ Interviews WA #10, 17, 16, 20). The Board and its staff held meetings across 
the state to discuss the concept of higher education accountability (Authors’ Interview 
WA #16). Moreover, the legislature asked both the Higher Education Coordinating Board 
and the State Board for Community and Technical Colleges for input into the 
performance measures that were to be used (Authors’ Interviews WA #2, 14; see also 
Jenkins, Ellwein, & Boswell, 2009; Nisson, 2003). 
 However, neither board was on record as clearly supporting performance funding. 
Moreover, both the Higher Education Coordinating Board and the State Board for 
Community and Technical Colleges did not approve of the type of performance funding 
system that appeared in the 1997–1999 budget proviso, which was based on holding back 
a certain portion of funding and requiring institutions to win it back (Authors’ Interviews 
WA #9, 20). In fact, both boards later recommended that the performance funding system 
be discontinued after the 1997–1999 biennium (Authors’ Interview WA #9). 
Opponents. A coalition opposed to performance funding for higher education 
was also present in Washington State. This coalition was mostly made up of the 
presidents and faculty of the state universities (Authors’ Interviews #2, 5, 11, 12, 14, 16, 
17, 21, 22).21 We found no evidence that this coalition actively mobilized against the 
adoption of the 1997 budget proviso—in part because it had been added to the budget 
with little warning—but the negative attitude toward performance funding was palpable. 
One legislator told us that higher education institutions “tended to hate” the state’s 
original performance funding program. An executive branch official reiterated this point, 
stating that the institutions were “absolutely” opposed to performance funding, arguing 
that the program largely duplicated the institutional accreditation process. This executive 
official said that institutions’ “principal argument was that we go through an accreditation 
process. What more do you need?” Institutions also opposed performance funding 
                                                 
21 The public two-year colleges were not as opposed as the state universities.  While the universities argued 
for throwing out the entire system, the State Board for Community and Technical Colleges argued that the 
performance indicators should be more closely aligned with the missions of the community and technical 
colleges and the money should take the form of new funding rather than a holdback of a portion of the 





because it sought to apply standardized performance metrics to many different kinds of 
organizations. According to a former higher education official: 
Institutions were very diverse, very different, had different 
missions, for example. Our community college system 
versus the four-year system, and inside the four-year 
system, there are the research universities and the state 
universities. So they didn’t see that being a very fair 
comparison. And that internally, it would not be really of 
much use for them in helping to manage the institution. So 
there was much resistance to it.  
More generally, higher education institutions highly valued their own autonomy 
(Authors’ Interview WA #5). As one higher education insider explained, “The 
institutions collectively want more autonomy from the state, not more control, and so I 
mean, I think the notion was ‘We know best how to run our institutions.’” Accordingly, 
institutions believed that they should have a say in the performance measures by which 
they would be judged and have sufficient resources to adequately fund their operations.  
Not involved: The general public. Our research revealed no strong demand on 
the part of the general public for performance funding in Washington. According to one 
of our respondents, Washington had experienced a general public discussion during the 
1990s “about the appropriate level of funding and restricting the growth of government 
revenue” (Authors’ Interview WA #9). And in 1993, Washington voters passed a limit on 
government expenditures (Authors’ Interviews; see also Lefberg, 1999; Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 1993). This enactment was not directed specifically at higher education; 
rather, it applied generally to all state expenditures (see Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 1993).  
 Yet despite the general public’s attitudes toward government and efficiency, there 
was no strong public demand to hold higher education institutions accountable through 
performance funding (Authors’ Interviews WA #9, 14). Indeed, according to one higher 
education insider, the general public’s concerns about higher education at that time 
related largely to student access to higher education:  
I think that there was more interest in the general public 
about making sure that their son or daughter had an 
opportunity to go to college. And at that time … some of 
our institutions were talking about limiting the freshman 





7.3 The Process of Enacting Performance Funding in 1997 
The main driving force behind the 1997–1999 performance funding proviso was 
the chair of the Appropriations Committee of the Washington House of Representatives 
(Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23; see also Nisson, 
2003). According to a state government insider, the chair: 
… had a real bee in his bonnet about performance funding, 
and used his position to require that in the budget there 
were for the institutions indicators that were sort of 
performance indicators. … He chaired the Appropriations 
Committee. That’s a very powerful position in our state, 
and he was a strong person. … He was a real … leader in 
thinking about performance funding, and it was just 
literally his stubbornness that made it happen.  
The Appropriations Committee chair was a businessman who strongly favored the 
application of business practices to government (Authors’ Interviews #2, 22, 23; also see 
Shukovsky, 1997). As an insider with varied experience in state government noted, the 
chair “had a business background and was in management … and … business practices 
[were] something that he wanted to see adopted in public activities including education 
and higher education.” A former state legislative staff member described how the chair 
drove the passage of the budget proviso:  
When it came to higher education, at least during that 
session, he expressed a strong desire to have some kind of 
outcome-based, performance-based piece for higher 
education. … I really don’t remember anyone particularly 
having a whole lot of interest in it except for him and 
obviously some members of his committee. So the 
initiation really came out of the House of Representatives 
Appropriations Committee Chair. It was not something that 
was discussed as a major priority for the Senate. It was 
definitely a House initiative.  
Agenda setting. Washington State’s economic and political circumstances 
provided two key openings that made it more likely that performance funding would get 
on the state government’s agenda for an authoritative decision. First, although state 
revenues had risen sharply, thus moving the state away from the economic difficulties of 





education and corrections. Moreover, in 1993, voters had passed Initiative 601, which 
restricted the growth of state spending (Authors’ Interview WA #23; also see Ammons, 
1997; Shukovsky, 1997). These circumstances made lawmakers look to higher education 
as a natural place to keep spending down (Authors’ Interviews WA #9, 14; also see 
Shukovsky, 1997). A higher education official told us:  
Higher education is typically an area where lawmakers find 
the capacity to bring the budget into balance, because it’s 
… a discretionary spending item, in contrast to so many 
other things in the budget. So there was not … any sense of 
a particular crisis in higher education, that Washington 
institutions were not working in an efficient manner, but 
there was some concern that improvements could and 
should be made in efficiency in higher education. … There 
was some data available that probably struck at least some 
members of the legislature as areas where there could be 
some improvements in efficiency, and by doing that, either 
provide some relief for the budget or for some more 
capacity in the system to provide additional access.  
 Second, the 1997–1999 budget was passed on the heels of an election that gave 
Washington Republicans control over both branches of the state legislature (Authors’ 
Interviews WA #5, 9, 23; see also Modie, 1996). Republican control contributed to the 
proviso’s adoption. As one higher education insider remarked:  
[I]t was the first time in a long time that a Republican 
majority wrote the budget for the state in 1997. … At least 
one could make the argument that the political climate and 
specifically, the majority control of the legislature, may 
have had something to do with both the adoption of this 
policy framework, as well as its short life.  
The then-Republican majority in the state legislature (like the Republican majority in 
Congress that came to power around the same time) favored less government spending 
and greater government accountability (Authors’ Interviews WA #5, 23; also see 
Shukovsky, 1997). A higher education insider explained: 
[N]ationally the Republicans had taken control of Congress 
in 1994, after having not been in power for you know 
several years. And then, and that happened at the state level 
here as well. In fact, the lower chamber, House of 





side, after having not been in power for more than a 
decade. And so there was a lot of the whole philosophy of 
their “Contract with America” [which] was reducing taxes, 
reducing the burden on taxpayers … reducing budget 
expenditures as much as possible.  
7.4 The 2007 Community College Student Achievement Initiative  
 While Washington’s first performance funding program ended in 1999, the state 
reintroduced another program eight years later. In 2007, the State Board for Community 
and Technical Colleges established the Student Achievement Initiative (SAI) for 
Washington’s two-year colleges (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2; see also Jenkins et al., 
2009; Washington State Board for Community and Technical Colleges [WSBCTC], 
2007).  
Unlike the 1997–1999 performance funding proviso, the State Board’s new 
performance funding system was designed not to withhold any money from institutions 
but to reward technical and community colleges with a small amount of new money when 
their students reach certain outcomes thresholds.22 Performance indicators include 
competency in basic skills, pass rates for postsecondary-level mathematics and 
developmental coursework, and the number of degrees, certificates, and college credits 
granted. Under the funding formula, colleges receive “achievement points” when their 
students reach certain goals on these indicators. The 2008 fiscal year was a “learning 
year,” which involved community and technical colleges examining their performance on 
these measures and developing plans to improve. During the 2009 fiscal year, institutions 
began to be rewarded for their performance on the measures (Authors’ Interviews WA 
#1, 2; see also Jenkins et al., 2009; WSBCTC, 2007).  
7.5 Patterns of Support and Opposition for the 2007 Student Achievement Initiative   
Supporters. The coalition supporting this new type of performance funding for 
community colleges is comprised primarily of board members and administrators of the 
Washington State Board for Community and Technical Colleges along with local 
community and technical college officials (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2, 18; see also 
                                                 
22 Although this program was designed to reward institutions for meeting certain performance levels, 
whether appropriations are considered to be a “bonus” or funding that would have been part of the base if 





Jenkins et al., 2009, p. 14). In the words of one State Board staffer: “The … plan is 
[from] our own State Board for Community and Technical Colleges. The Board itself has 
asked for this plan or approach.” While local community and technical college officials 
are not the primary instigators of the Student Achievement Initiative, they do seem to be 
willing members of the coalition. College trustees, administrators, and professors were 
part of the Board’s task force that helped to create the system (Authors’ Interviews WA 
#7, 23; see also Jenkins et al., 2009, pp. 24–25; WSBCTC, 2007).23 As a result, there is a 
feeling among practitioners that there has been greater consultation in planning the SAI 
than was the case with the development of the 1997–1999 performance funding system. 
Moreover, local community college officials believe that the Student Achievement 
Initiative is founded on solid research (Authors’ Interview WA #7; see also Jenkins et al., 
2009, pp. 24–25). As a community college president noted:  
[The system has] heavily analyzed the research and … 
know[s] how our system in this state performs. And we 
know how we do on those things, and that those things are 
related to achieving some of the outcomes. They’re really 
related to getting people through a system and through a 
process and getting into important outcome points. … It 
will make us more efficient as a system in handling these 
folks.  
Even though the Student Achievement Initiative was the creation of the state two-
year college system, other public officials in the state, including the governor, were 
supportive of the program (Authors’ Interviews WA #2, 23; see also Jenkins et al., 2009, 
pp. 42–43). According to a state-level higher education official, “[B]oth the governor and 
the legislature, I think, viewed it as a very positive development and a model for how we 
go forward.”  
The Washington coalition supporting the community and technical colleges’ 
Student Achievement Initiative appears to hold beliefs similar to the coalition that 
supported the state’s original performance funding program: that market incentives can 
influence behavior, and that tying funding to institutional performance can improve 
colleges’ outcomes (Authors’ Interview WA #1, 2; see also Jenkins et al., 2009; Rolph, 
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2007). A member of the State Board noted: “We did the debate of whether or not it’s best 
to reward process or to reward outcome. We landed on rewarding outcome” (as cited in 
Rolph, 2007). In the words of a  State Board administrator, there was “a belief on the part 
of the Board … based on experience in their work world, in other parts of government … 
that performance funding can actually provide an incentive for improvement.”  
Based on this belief, the State Board believes that funding for outcomes can be 
used to improve student success in the public two-year colleges (Authors’ Interviews WA 
#1, 2). According to a State Board staffer: 
[O]ur Board [was] really aware that there are retention 
issues in the community and technical college sector. 
We’re not unlike community colleges in other states, where 
there are a lot of students that come, and not an awful lot 
that finish. And so our Board has been aware of that for a 
number of years, and so … the Board wanted to figure out 
a way of providing some incentives for colleges to improve 
student persistence.  
Another belief supporting the Student Achievement Initiative was focused more 
on maintaining the autonomy of the state’s community college system (Authors’ 
Interviews WA #1, 18). There was growing interest on the part of the governor and the 
legislature in performance accountability. Recognizing that this interest was unlikely to 
slacken, the Board believed that it would be best if the board acted in advance, designing 
itself the performance funding system (Authors’ Interviews WA #1b, 18; see also Jenkins 
et al., 2009, p. 24). As one State Board administrator explained, there had been:  
a lot of focus on accountability in education and higher 
education this past year-and-a-half, under the Governor’s 
Washington Learns Initiative. … [Also] our Governor has 
formed a P-20 Council. … And one of the goals of that P-
20 Council is to identify some indicators for education and 
higher education. … So we were trying to be proactive 
about identifying results measurements for the colleges 
ourselves before somebody else starts saying, what about 
this? Or what about that?  
To this end, the Board directed its own resources toward developing a non-punitive 





7.6 The Process of Enacting the 2007 Student Achievement Initiative 
 As was the case with the 1997–1999 proviso, the State Board’s new performance 
funding system was not initiated at the behest of the general public, and it was not the 
invention of the business community (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2). But unlike the 
prior system, the Student Achievement Initiative did not originate in the state legislature. 
Rather, the Student Achievement Initiative was spearheaded by the State Board for 
Community and Technical Colleges (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2, 18, 22, 23). In the 
words of a state-level higher education official, this program “was initiated by and led by 
the community and technical college system. They developed it internally, and they’ve 
done a terrific job of selling it to a broader community.” The main impetus to this 
initiative was a turnover in the State Board, which brought in several new members who 
were in business and who had a strong interest in performance accountability (Jenkins et 
al., 2009, p. 23).  
 To develop this program, the State Board convened a task force and advisory 
committee—which included not only State Board personnel but also community college 
presidents, trustees, and other institutional personnel—to help design the performance 
funding system (Authors’ Interviews WA #1, 2, 18, 22; see also Jenkins et al., 2009; 
WSBCTC, 2007). The task force developed the principles, goals, and design of the 
policy, soliciting advice from college personnel at the state’s community and technical 
colleges as well as from national higher education experts. A system-wide advisory 
committee comprised of representatives from all interested colleague groups in the 
college system (such as institutional researchers and student support professionals) 
helped design the performance indicators and measures. The task force’s 
recommendations were then forwarded to the State Board for approval (Authors’ 
Interviews WA #2, 22; also see Jenkins et al., 2009, p. 9).  
Policy learning. The reemergence of performance funding in Washington can be 
seen as evidence of policy learning. To begin with, the Washington State Board for 
Community and Technical Colleges had moved to a position of supporting performance 
funding in 2007, whereas it was at best neutral in 1997.  Moreover, it developed the 
Student Achievement Initiative based on research and advice from its staffers, local 





also Achieving the Dream, 2007; Jenkins et al., 2009, p. 9; WSBCTC, 2007). A state 
community and technical college official explained that the program was designed with 
careful consideration of relevant research: 
[W]e asked three national experts to give us advice. … And 
amongst the things they said to us, is be focused. … Keep it 
really simple so that you can communicate it. … They also 
said reward people for evidence of improvement. Don’t 
reward them for processes, which is always the 
conversation that you get into with college people. Isn’t it 
good to have faculty better engaged with students, for 
example? This is a common conversation. … But the 
advice was, provide a reward for evidence of improvement. 
So these are things that we have done in the system.  
Additionally, having learned from Washington’s prior experience with 
performance funding that the process of developing a performance funding program is 
important in itself, the State Board kept the process of the state’s earlier performance 
funding system in mind when designing its new plan (Authors’ Interview WA #2). A 
community and technical college board official told us: 
[For] the previous proposal [in 1997] basically the three 
indicators were developed in three days, literally in three 
days. And they were sprung upon us. The legislature said 
you’re going to have three, you’re going to have to have 
indicators, and you’re going to have to have them in three 
days.  
But this would not be the case with the new program, as the same official explained: 
People have had basically one academic year to think it 
through. … That time frame to engage people, of course 
there’s a lot of complaining time as well, but I think it’s 
better. If you really truly want your performance funding to 
be for improvement, then you’ve got to have people very 
engaged, and you have to have time for systems, large 
systems to have people engaged. Even to know, let alone 
get engaged, that certainly wasn’t the case the first time 
around.  
Agenda setting. Washington State’s culture and economic circumstances around 





government attention to performance funding as designed by the State Board for 
Community and Technical Colleges. First, the state’s economy was doing relatively well  
at the time, making it easier to countenance providing new performance-based funding 
for higher education. In the words of a State Board administrator, Washington State had 
“lots of money” when the Student Achievement Initiative began (Authors’ Interview WA 
#2). Indeed, this same respondent speculated that it may be difficult for the State Board to 
maintain funding for this program in the future if the economy were to shift for the worse 
(Authors’ Interview WA #2).  
 Second, in the years leading up to the adoption of the Student Achievement 
Initiative, state accountability programs had been discussed and implemented in other 
governmental sectors. One such accountability initiative—the Government Management, 
Accountability and Performance (GMAP) program—had come into being in the years 
before the Student Achievement Initiative was conceptualized (Authors’ Interviews WA 
#1b, 20; see also Jenkins et al., 2009, p. 14; Van Lare, 2006). The purpose of GMAP was 
“to hold state agencies directly accountable for achieving results and focusing on 
priorities important to citizens” (Van Lare, 2006, p. 5).  
 In addition to GMAP, the state of Washington had begun to focus on 
accountability in the education sector. The governor and legislature had coordinated a 
task force known as “Washington Learns” to examine K-12 and higher education and to 
make recommendations for improving public education in the state (Authors’ Interview 
#13; see also Washington Learns, 2006). Also in the years preceding the adoption of the 
Student Achievement Initiative, the legislature had seriously discussed the possibility of 
adopting performance agreements for higher education institutions, under which the state 
legislature would provide funding to institutions up-front; in exchange, colleges and 
universities would agree to produce specific minimum outcomes, such as a certain 
number of degrees in “high-demand” subjects (Authors’ Interviews WA #11, 13).24 It 
was within this policy environment of accountability that the Student Achievement 
Initiative was conceived. Indeed, a state legislator speculated that the State Board of 
Community and Technical Colleges may have decided to pursue the Student 
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Achievement Initiative because it was aware that the legislature was interested in 
accountability around that time (Authors’ Interview WA #18).  
7.7 Summary  
Washington established performance funding programs at two different times: 
1997 and 2007. These two programs differ in substance, who supported and opposed 
them, and the circumstances that existed at the time each program was adopted. The 
state’s first performance funding program, which applied to all public higher education 
institutions, was developed by the legislature and was cheered on by the governor and the 
business community, while the affected institutions were largely uninvolved in its 
development and disliked the concept behind the program. The more recent Student 
Achievement Initiative, which applies only to the public two-year colleges, was 
developed by the State Board for Community and Technical Colleges and did not face 
opposition from the institutions themselves. The 1997–1999 program was created at a 
time of fiscal uncertainty when Republicans controlled the state legislature. However, the 
Student Achievement Initiative was developed in a political environment at a time when 
the state budget was healthy and Democrats controlled the legislature. 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
We summarize below our findings across six states concerning the actors who 
supported and opposed performance funding, their beliefs and motives, the sources of 
their ideas, and the circumstances shaping their actions. We finish by drawing 
conclusions for policymaking.  
8.1 Summary of Findings Across Six States 
As detailed in the previous sections, the processes by which performance funding 
has been established exhibit considerable variation across Florida, Illinois, Missouri, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. At the same time, there are striking 
similarities among these six states, particularly in terms of who were the main supporters 
and opponents, what beliefs animated them, and what political openings allowed political 






Supporters. In all six states, the main proponents of performance funding were 
state officials. In Florida, South Carolina, and Washington (in 1997), state legislators, 
particularly Republicans, played the leading role. Meanwhile, state higher education  
board officials played the leading role in Illinois, Missouri, Tennessee, and Washington 
(in 2007).25 Governors were openly supportive in four states (Florida, Missouri, South 
Carolina, and Washington) but played a significant role in only the first two states.  
These leading state officials were joined in supporting performance funding by 
local college officials (particularly from community colleges) and business. Officials of 
individual public colleges were openly supportive of performance funding in Florida, 
Illinois, Tennessee, and Washington (in 2007). In fact, in all four states, college and 
university officials were directly involved in designing the performance funding system. 
Meanwhile, business supported performance funding in a direct and organized 
fashion in South Carolina, Washington, and Florida. In South Carolina, a group of 
business leaders pushed hard for performance funding for higher education, working 
closely with legislative activists to secure and then design the performance funding 
system. In Washington, business openly favored performance funding. In Florida, though 
business did not endorse performance funding specifically, it strongly endorsed the 1994 
Government Performance and Accountability Act that gave rise to performance funding.   
In addition to its direct participation, business also played an important indirect 
role. In South Carolina, Washington, Florida, and  Missouri, business concerns about 
government efficiency strongly shaped the politics of performance funding by making 
performance funding an attractive policy for higher education in the eyes of state officials 
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  TN  MO  FL  SC  IL  WA 
 
Supporters (leading groups are in bold) 
Legislators    X  X  X    X 1997 
Governor    X  X  X    X 1997 
State higher education 
board officials 
X  X  X    X  X 2007 
Local (institutional) 
officials 
X    X    X  X 2007 
Business (direct)       X  X    X 1997 





  X  X  X    X 1997 
Need to increase 
government efficiency 








X  X  X    X   
Need to increase quality 
of higher education 
  X      X  X 2007 
Need to increase 
accountability 














    X GOP  X GOP  X GOP  X 1997 GOP 
Change in party control 
of governorship 
  X Dem    X GOP     
Economic recession      X       
Economic prosperity            X 2007 
Antitax mood  X  X  X      X 1997 
Spillover from other 
policy subsystems 








  TN  MO  FL  SC  IL  WA 
 
Sources of Ideas for Performance Funding 
Policy learning  X    X  X    X 2007 
External state policy 
organizations 
    X  X      
Other states      X  X  X   
Outside experts  X  X  X    X  X 2007 
 
Opponents 
State universities    X Inactive  X  X Inactive    X 1997 














  X  X  X     
PF will lead to closing 
institutions 
      X     
PF undercuts higher 
education autonomy 
  X        X 1997 
PF raises institutional 
costs 
  X         
PF does not work well      X  X     
PF duplicates 
accreditation system 




Florida had the broadest advocacy coalition, consisting of the governor, 
legislators, state higher education board officials, business, and community college 
presidents. Narrower coalitions were present in Missouri, South Carolina, and 
Washington in 1997: legislators, the governor (weakly), and either the state coordinating 
board or business. The narrowest coalitions were present in Illinois, Tennessee, and 
Washington in 2007: a state higher education board and the heads of individual colleges 
(particularly community colleges).   





and insufficient room at public colleges and universities may have played a role in 
putting the issue of higher education effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability on the 
issue attention agenda in Washington, but we have no evidence that it played such a role 
in the other states. Even in Washington, popular pressure did not focus at all on 
performance funding as a specific solution to this concern about accountability.  
Supporters’ beliefs and motives. The main beliefs tying together the supporters of 
performance funding were beliefs in the importance of finding new means to secure 
additional funds for higher education in a time of fiscal stringency and in the importance 
of increasing the efficiency of government generally and higher education specifically. In 
addition, there was more scattered belief in the importance of increasing the quality of 
higher education, increasing the accountability of higher education, meeting the 
workforce needs of business, and preventing performance funding from being imposed 
on higher education without higher education institutions having a hand in designing it. 
For legislators, governors, and business, the main beliefs were in the importance of 
increasing the efficiency of government and higher education and in the utility of market 
or business-oriented methods such as performance funding in making government 
agencies operate more efficiently. These beliefs can be clearly seen in Florida, Missouri, 
South Carolina, and Washington. However, for state and local higher education officials 
in all the states except South Carolina, the driving belief was in the importance of finding 
new means of securing additional funds for higher education institutions in a time of 
fiscal stringency. Performance funding particularly recommended itself as a means of 
securing new funds because it couched requests for new funding in terms that resonated 
with current concerns about limited government revenues and the utility of market-like 
forces in government. 
Opponents. There was discernible opposition to performance funding in four of 
the six states (Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, and Washington) coming from public 
institutions, particularly the state universities. However, this opposition was not 
mobilized, except to a degree in Florida and Washington. Rather, this institutional 
opposition was primarily expressed by lack of enthusiasm and foot dragging, rather than 






Opponents’ beliefs and motives. The main beliefs driving opponents were that 
performance funding was an excuse to keep down the regular state funding for higher 
education, that it undercut the autonomy of higher education institutions, and that the 
performance funding programs proposed did not sufficiently recognize different 
institutional missions. The first belief was evident in Florida, Missouri, and South 
Carolina, where institutions expressed a fear that performance funding would provide 
state officials with an excuse to cut back on the regular state funding of higher education. 
The belief that performance funding intruded on the autonomy of higher education 
institutions was present in Missouri and Washington. Institutions felt they knew how best 
to run themselves and resented performance indicators that were perceived as affecting 
what courses should be offered and how they should be taught. Finally, higher education 
institutions in Missouri and Washington criticized the performance funding programs in 
those states as failing to tailor performance indicators to different institutional missions. 
Indicators were perceived as not making sufficient distinctions among research 
universities, other state four-year institutions, and community colleges.27  
Sources of ideas. It is not always easy to determine the source in a given state for 
the idea of performance funding. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith have argued that a potent 
path to policy change is created when an advocacy coalition encounters new data that 
questions its policy core or secondary beliefs about the severity of a public problem and 
the best ways to address it (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
In fact, we found evidence of such policy learning in three states. Florida and South 
Carolina had been experimenting with performance accountability policies for a long 
period of time. They moved to performance funding as they perceived limitations to the 
effectiveness of less intrusive forms of performance accountability, such as performance 
reporting and incentive funding. Meanwhile, in Washington in 2007, the advocates of 
performance funding were influenced by the state’s previous experience with 
performance funding.   
In addition, the experiences of other states and advice from outside organizations 
and experts can play an important role in the development of performance funding 
                                                 
27 Some of these concerns were also present in Illinois but they were more muted because the performance 
funding system proposed applied only to community colleges and the community college presidents had 





(McLendon, Heller, & Young, 2005).  Observers in three states (Florida, Illinois, and 
South Carolina) noted how performance funding activists in these states were influenced 
by the examples and experiences of other states, particularly Tennessee (as the first state) 
and South Carolina (as the most radical state).28 Regional and national policy 
organizations played a role as well (McLendon et al., 2005, p. 388). Interviewees in two 
states (Florida and South Carolina) mentioned that activists were influenced—either 
through personal contact or exposure to relevant publications—by organizations, such as 
the Southern Regional Education Board and the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, that held discussions about performance funding or even recommended it.  
Finally, outside experts—such as consultants—were sources of ideas in all six states.  
Fairly frequently these consultants were associated with the National Center for Higher 
Education Management Systems.   
Political openings and occasions for action. Relatively transitory political 
events played an important role in our six states by providing political openings for 
advocates of performance funding to advance this idea. As Kingdon (1995) and Sabatier 
and Weible (2007) point out, “policy windows” or “external shocks” provide an 
opportunity for policy proposals to get a hearing that they might not otherwise get. The 
most important political opening—present in all but Tennessee—was a change in party 
control of either the legislature or the governorship. Particularly important was 
Republican capture of a new house of the legislature. This greatly increased the number 
and power of legislators who were predisposed to favor market-like incentives as a way 
of securing desirable government outcomes. This central role of Republican state 
legislators fits the finding by McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton (2006, p. 11) that the 
probability of a state adopting performance funding legislation is significantly associated 
with a higher percentage of Republican legislators.  
 Another important political opening was a growing antitax mood among the 
electorate and politically influential interest groups.  This provided an opening to 
promote performance funding in the name of securing both greater efficiencies from 
higher education and new higher education funding that was not based on rising 
                                                 
28 The lessons learned may be not just about what to do but also about what not to do. Performance funding 





enrollments.     
 Finally, the advent of performance accountability in a related policy subsystem 
also created a political opening for advancing the idea of performance funding. In 
Tennessee and Washington (in 2007), increasing state interest in performance 
accountability for K-12 schooling led higher education officials to develop a performance 
funding plan of their own, rather than risk having one be imposed that they did not find 
palatable. Similarly, in Illinois, the advent of the radical South Carolina plan led Illinois 
community college officials to move proactively to develop a form of performance 
planning that was less radical.  
The weakness of egalitarian concerns. One of the surprising features of the 
discourse on performance funding in the six states we have examined is how little 
concern has been expressed about the possible impacts of performance funding on 
equality of higher education opportunity. We have seen little discussion about how 
performance funding might enhance (or damage) access to and success in higher 
education for underserved populations, such as low-income students, students of color, or 
older students. Performance accountability systems can enhance the prospects of such 
students by making access to and success in college for disadvantaged students important 
performance indicators. Conversely, performance funding can damage the prospects of 
these students to the degree that it rewards higher course completion and graduation rates 
but does not deter public colleges from boosting both rates by becoming more selective in 
admissions (Dougherty, Hare, & Natow, 2009; Dougherty & Hong, 2006). Performance 
funding is too important a policy instrument not to be subject to careful analysis and 
discussion of how to maximize its positive impacts on equality of higher education 
opportunity (Dougherty, Hare, & Natow, 2009).     
8.2 Lessons for Policymaking 
For those interested in performance funding as a policy, our findings carry a 
number of implications. First, the supporters of performance funding usually did not 
include the state universities, very important actors within the higher education policy 
subsystem. Their opposition prevented the spread of performance funding to the state 
universities in Florida. Moreover, it played a key role in the later demise of performance 





2009; Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, forthcoming). Key to securing their support would be 
to address their fears that performance funding provides an excuse to keep down regular 
state funding for higher education, undercuts the autonomy of higher education 
institutions, and insufficiently recognizes different institutional missions. At the very 
least, this suggests the usefulness of extended consultation with higher education 
institutions to address their concerns.  
Second, community colleges were more supportive of performance funding than 
were the state universities. They provided key support for performance funding in 
Florida, Illinois, and Washington (in 2007). However, the main reason community 
colleges supported for performance funding was to secure additional state funds, as 
enrollment-based financing was failing to grow sufficiently rapidly. This emphasis on 
new revenues makes performance funding vulnerable when an economic downturn cuts 
into government appropriations for higher education. Faced with such cuts, higher 
education institutions prefer to eliminate performance funding in order to prevent deeper 
cuts in their base appropriations (Dougherty & Natow, 2009; Dougherty, Natow, & Vega, 
forthcoming). For those wishing to protect performance funding, this argues for retaining 
the support of community colleges for performance funding by justifying it as more than 
just a source of new revenues and, in any case, by finding ways to insulate performance 
funding from the ups and downs of the state revenue cycle.    
Finally, it is noteworthy that the supporters of performance funding in our six 
states did not include groups that principally view higher education as a means to serve 
social equality. Missing from the supporters of performance funding were minority 
groups and other equality-oriented groups. Addressing such groups and their concerns 
would not only broaden the political support for performance funding but also make it 
more likely to promote not just greater government efficiency and service to the economy 
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